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Iëre, now called Trinidad, was so named by its First Peoples: “Land of the Hummingbird,” in reverence 
of the beauty and distinctiveness of the varied specimens found on the island. Above all other animals, 
hummingbirds were protected by the Great Spirit, since they carried the souls of those gone by—the 
souls of the ancestors.  
 
In one Southern valley village they were especially numerous. After a great victory in a tribal war, the 
people of the village became greedy and proud; so proud were they that they forgot about Great Spirit 
and the departed souls carried by the hummingbirds. They began to hunt the birds for their colourful 
jewel-toned feathers. So hungry were the people for adornment for a victory parade that once there 
was a mass slaughter. The feathers adorned their spears, bows and bodies as they broke the ancient law 
of the Great Spirit.  
Great Spirit grew angry and sought to avenge the spirits of the ancestors. Yet the pillage continued. 
 
One day a terrible thing happened in this lush and beautiful valley: The anger of Great Spirit rose like a 
black cloud over the valley and the very land opened beneath the people’s feet. A thick black mass 
engulfed the village, swallowing up the entire tribe. It rose higher and higher still, filling the vale until 
there was nothing but a trim of underbrush left around it. 
This lake of pitch has been there ever since, eventually becoming the source of a booming asphalt 
industry. 
 
It is said that once a tree grew up from its depths, alive and reaching ten feet tall. It looked around and 
saw the new people brought over from Africa, working in the fields and singing sad songs. It sank back 
down again into the dark depths of the lake. No new life has been seen to emerge from it ever since.  
 
Later, European settlers were warned about their own fascination with the birds. Hunted, killed and 
preserved, dead hummingbirds and their feathers adorned European hats, parlours and works of art. 
This went on until bird watchers, inspired by Great Spirit, sought to protect them. 
 
adapted from oral retellings by Tracee Assing and Dr. Theodore Ferguson 
Abstract 
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This Major Research paper asks the questions: What would an ecologically sustainable, system-
thinking based vision for planning and development in the Caribbean look like? And how can 
systems dynamics modelling help to make this vision a reality? 
Through the critical presentation of the current “crisis of development” that has left the Caribbean 
vulnerable and economically disadvantaged; the Caribbean’s historical, socio-economic, 
environmental and planning context with respect to this crisis, and a  planning framework rooted 
in systems theory, I conclude with a description of such a vision in Part 1.  
Part 2 involves the system dynamics modelling exercise in which I examine land use changes on 
a Caribbean island state, while also evaluating the method as a valuable tool for planning and 
policymaking. 
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I dedicate this work to all of my past selves 
who thought this feat impossible, 
and to all of my futures selves,  
should I ever need reminding of my resilience. 
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Foreword 
 
For my MES Plan of Study, I entitled my Area of Concentration “Planning for International 
Development: Facilitating Alternatives,” as I sought an exploration of models and systems of 
alternative and ecological economics, and their implications for and applications to the practice 
of planning for international development. With a regional focus on the Americas, I set out to 
examine the ways in which the hemisphere already has and still can incorporate its unique 
historical plurality into its planning and development, and the ways in which states and civil 
society can better facilitate economic alternatives to serve biospheric wellbeing.  
My learning objectives were organized according to 3 components of my area of concentration: 
the Context of the Americas; Alternative and Ecological Economics, and International 
Development Planning, and consisted in an expansion of historical and theoretical knowledge in 
these areas, as well as technical knowledge of ecological economics methods. Through courses 
in both the Planning certificate and the Economics for the Anthropocene program, individual 
directed studies on my regional area of focus, membership in the Centre for Research in Latin 
America and the Caribbean, and an internship at the Inter-American Development Bank, I am 
confident in my fulfillment of my learning objectives. 
This paper, then serves as a culmination of these efforts, as I present the knowledge and new 
ideas and questions sparked by my Plan of Study, and demonstrate my capacity to use the 
technical method of system dynamics modelling. In these pages, I propose a vision for planning 
and development in the Caribbean that is rooted in the principles of ecological sustainability, 
systems-thinking and social justice, which I hope will inspire other academics, policy-makers 
and citizens to work toward resilience in one of the most vulnerable regions in the world. 
I have certainly been changed by this exercise and will carry with me the skills, knowledge, 
values, ideas and questions that both inspired and have been inspired by this Major Research 
Paper. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
There is a well-established and increasingly urgent interest in the fields of international 
development and affairs, of attaining “sustainable development:” an advancement of the material well-
being and social progress of people—especially those most impoverished and marginalized—that is 
environmentally responsible, and averts as much as possible further human contributions to the imminent 
threat of climate change. At the same time, in the field of economics over the past few decades, criticisms 
of the neoliberal paradigm and its teaching apparatus are also well-established and growing, with new 
heterodox economic thinking, writing and teaching shared every year. Of particular interest to me has 
been the heterogenous field of ecological economics that, simply put, seeks to reposition the economy as 
a subsystem of society and of the planet as a whole—the natural ecosystem that has allowed our species 
to thrive. 
Common to both of these developments is the work of climate scientists and environmentalists: 
prioritization of ecological harmony in the way that we understand, manage and envision the world and 
our place in it. The purpose of this Major Research Paper is to merge the efforts of these two fields, in 
application to the Caribbean, my home, and one of the world regions most vulnerable to the negative 
consequences of global warming and a changing climate. Thus, I will examine the prospects for 
prosperity in Caribbean small-island developing states, taking into account the shift in perspectives and 
practices necessary to secure that prosperity and resilience in the face of current and future challenges.  
My research question consists of two parts:  
1. What should the objectives and framework of planning and development in the 
Caribbean look like, if aimed at a vision that is that is ecologically sustainable and 
rooted in systems theory? 
2. To what extent can system dynamics help to make such a vision a reality? 
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In the first instance I have relied on literature reviews and critical analyses to develop an answer, enclosed 
in Part 1 of this paper, while Part 2 seeks to answer the second question in the application of system 
dynamics modelling using STELLA® software. My objectives are thus to develop a framework and 
vision for planning and development in the Caribbean that is ecologically sustainable and rooted in 
systems science, and to demonstrate the application of system dynamics as a tool to further such a 
framework and vision.  
 My sources range from the fields of ecological economics and complexity science, to critical 
planning and development theory, Caribbean and Latin American social theory, political economy and 
planning literature, my model was built using the World Bank’s World Development Indicators for 
Caribbean small states.  
 As mentioned earlier, this paper consists of two parts. Part 1, consisting of three chapters which: 
lay out the foundation of the ecological crisis, and the attendant crises in development and economics and 
the need for fundamental shifts (Chapter 1); provides the history and context of the planning and 
development in the Caribbean, as well as the region’s unique present and imminent challenges (Chapter 
2); considers the application of systems science to the practice of planning and development in the 
Caribbean context, introducing the need for systems science-based tools in planning and policymaking 
(Chapter 3). After each chapter is a short case study- highlight of concepts as food for thought in 
application of this framework: Rights of Nature, the Blue Economy and the Circular Economy 
respectively. 
Part 2 then presents and explains the model I built—of land use change on a Caribbean island 
state—along with scenarios, results, discussion, and an evaluation of system dynamics modelling as a 
viable and valuable policymaking tool.  
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PART 1 
 
Chapter 1: Development in Crisis 
 
Introducing the Crisis 
 
We are currently in the throes of a crisis of development that has been a long time coming. This is 
not news—in the Caribbean and across the planet, we face increasing climate and environmental 
instability: global average temperature has increased by one degree Celsius over the past hundred years, 
and is on track to warm by six degrees within this century. Glaciers are melting, sea levels are rising, 
entire species are going extinct at unprecedented rates, and the subsequent biodiversity loss is staggering. 
Deserts are expanding, seasons are changing, and natural disasters are becoming more frequent and 
damaging. It is estimated that two hundred and fifty million people will be displaced due to the effects of 
a changing climate by the year 2050. Our carbon dioxide emissions today exceed four hundred parts per 
million (one hundred ppm over sustainable levels). Through industrialization, and the expansion and 
increasing dependence on fossil fuels as the source of energy for our “progress,” we have made a 
greenhouse of our atmosphere, and trapped ourselves and our planet inside in the process. 
Our economic system calls for never-ending growth and expansion for survival, leading to the 
prevalence of a “race to the bottom” attitude, and a system of globalization that protects the interests of 
multinational corporations over sovereign nation-states and peoples (and ecosystems). And yet, despite all 
of this economic growth—this prosperity—to which we sacrifice Nature, poverty and hunger prevail, 
economic inequality is growing, millions of people lack access to basic services and many more live in 
conditions of precarity. And the god of economic growth is in decline: governments are imposing 
measures of increasing austerity to counteract budget deficits, while global debt accumulates in the 
trillions of US dollars.   
We are very literally and physically coming up against (and in some cases surpassing) the 
planetary boundaries of this Earth system—very real limits that are starting to manifest themselves in the 
decline of economic growth around the world. These boundaries lie around the natural biophysical 
resources and processes that make it possible for human life to thrive, and which, if crossed, would lead 
to intractable environmental change, namely: climate change; rate of biodiversity loss (terrestrial and 
marine); interference with the nitrogen and phosphorus cycles; stratospheric ozone depletion; ocean 
acidification; global freshwater use; change in land use; chemical pollution; and atmospheric aerosol 
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loading.1 These boundaries are represented in Figure 1 below, from the Stockholm Resilience Centre. The 
“safe operating space” is characterized by the green centre, with increasing uncertainty (and unsafety) 
moving outward. 
 
Figure 1: Planetary Boundaries: A Safe Operating Space for Humanity 
 
 
 
The challenge we face lies in putting a halt (as much as is possible) to further environmental 
damage and change, but it is not an easy feat. Human-induced climate change has been recognized as a 
problem for decades, and we still face countless political, social and economic roadblocks to enacting 
effective measures to curb the changes. Geologists have recently coined the term “Anthropocene” to refer 
to a new era of geologic time, in which human activity is the prime driver of change in the environment. 
There is disagreement over when exactly this new era began, but many agree that we have officially left 
the Holocene—the period of stability that has allowed the human species to thrive over the last twelve 
thousand years—and entered into a new period of instability instigated entirely by our species.  
If we are in the Anthropocene, sitting in the driver’s seat of our planet’s future, then how do we 
steer this spaceship towards sustainability and resilience? The answer is clear but not easy: we need to re-
imagine our place on this planet, from the Judaeo-Christian “dominion over the earth” that still permeates 
                                                           
1 Rockstrom et al. 2009. “Planetary Boundaries: Exploring the Safe Operating Space for Humanity.” Ecology and 
Society 14(2): 32. http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol14/iss2/art32/  
Stockholm Resilience Centre: http://www.stockholmresilience.org/research/planetary-boundaries/planetary-
boundaries/about-the-research/the-nine-planetary-boundaries.html  
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the Western psyche today, to an understanding of ourselves as emergent and embedded in Nature and 
neither separate from nor above it.  
This aligns well with the Traditional Ecological Knowledge (TEK) of Indigenous peoples that has 
emerged as a distinct field of study, in recognition that “Indigenous people all over the world developed 
sustainable environmental knowledge and practices that can be used to address problems that face global 
society.”2 Native ecology is the experience and understanding of complex human relationships in 
complex interaction with nature. It is not a concept, not a form of discrete, separate knowledge held by 
people, but rather an expression of the way of life of a particular group in their particular local context.  
There is no separation between the people and the environment in which they live; it is understood as part 
of their own existence, and the knowledge generated, shared and experienced is an intrinsic facet of that 
life relationship. It is a spiritual and all-encompassing ontology and cosmology, and one that is 
fundamentally ecologic in its recognition of the human place on land/in Creation. 
While this paper does not focus on the ontological and cosmological transformation required at 
the core of the sustained transition needed to face our current challenges—that is, I will not elaborate here 
on the nature of being and the origins and subsequent development of the universe—I do want to 
emphasize that I recognize the need for this fundamental change, and it is at the core of the proposed 
changes and ideas that will be explored and presented in this paper.  
One of the major consequences of our historical separation from Nature and our belief in a divine 
right to dominate the environment to serve our will is the very idea of progress that drives our economies, 
governments and societies in general. To advance, to develop, to progress has meant to expand, to cross 
the next frontier, to stake a claim on land otherwise inhabited. Now that almost all land is accounted for in 
a global network of property allocation, progress simply means more wealth, more technology, higher 
GDPs and growth rates. Thus the project of development has been pursued, first by European 
competition, wars, and mercantilism, colonialism and imperialism, and now to the rest of the world, made 
to believe that they might find similar routes to the same prosperity. Unfortunately however, there aren’t 
enough planet Earths to provide for such a reality—there aren’t even enough Earths to provide for current 
levels of consumption as we reach overshoot day3 around August of every year.  
                                                           
2 McGregor, D. (2004). Coming full circle: indigenous knowledge, environment and our future. American Indian 
Quarterly, 28(3-4), 385-410 
3 “Earth overshoot day marks the date when humanity’s demand for ecological resources and services in a given 
year exceeds what Earth can regenerate in that year…[it] is computed by dividing the planet’s biocapacity… by 
humanity’s Ecological Footprint … and multiplying by 365, the number of days in a year.” Global Footprint 
Network https://www.overshootday.org/about-earth-overshoot-day/ Overshoot day 2018 will occur on August 1st. 
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In the Caribbean and Latin America (as in other regions of the world historically exploited by 
colonization) there exists a rich history of critical thought, in the twentieth century especially, in 
opposition to the idea of progress that forms the basis of developmentalism, colonialism and neo/post-
colonial processes, all fundamentally rooted in the idea of progress that has caused this crisis in 
development.  
 
Caribbean and Latin American counter-narratives to developmentalism 
 
 The unique history of the Americas as the New World where “all the world” has resided for 
centuries, through migrations both voluntary and coerced, has created a rich tapestry of multicultural, 
critical, political-economic, and social thought. While the hemisphere has often been left out of global 
postcolonial literature many thinkers from Africa and Asia often make use of ideas that came from the 
Americas, and more specifically the Caribbean.4 Ideas like counterpoint and transculturation, creolization 
and mestizaje, hybridity and diaspora came from thinkers such as Fanon, Césaire, Martí, Ortiz, Glissant, 
Lamming, Retamar, James, Hall,5 whose ideas have such wide application in postcolonial theory due to 
their ability, distinct from most mainland Latin American thinkers, to theorize across the genocide of 
native peoples and fully contend with their multicultural diasporic realities, since no Caribbean discourse 
can truly claim to embody an Indigenous point of view.6 This presents a unique ethno-cultural reality with 
an  idiosyncratic perspective when contending with inclusion and participatory processes, which is by no 
means perfect in the Caribbean. 
Of particular significance is the resistance in Latin American studies to identify with 
“postcolonial” theory which arguably renders colonialism complete and temporally limited—an issue of 
the past—when in fact colonialism is as much a contemporary as it is an historical experience and issue. 
The study of coloniality offers an alternative, here implying the challenge of thinking “across” in order to 
conceptualize the “overarching structure of power that has impacted all aspects of social and political 
experience in Latin America since the beginning of the colonial era,”7 while also taking into account the 
                                                           
4 Hulme, Peter in Moraña, M., Dussel, E., & Jáuregui, C. A. (Eds.). (2008). “Postcolonial Theory and the 
Representation of Culture in the Americas” in Coloniality at Large: Latin America and the Postcolonial Debate. 
Durham: Duke University Press Books, 388-395 
5 Caribbean social theorists of the 19th and 20th centuries, whose work can be further explored in: Bolland, Nigel O. 
(ed.) 2004. The Birth of Caribbean Civilization. Kingston: Ian Randle. 
6 Hulme, 2008 
7 Moraña, M., Dussel, E., & Jáuregui, C. A. (Eds.). (2008). “Colonialism and its replicants” in Coloniality at Large: 
Latin America and the Postcolonial Debate. Durham: Duke University Press Books, 1-20. 
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pre-colonial and contemporary contributions of indigenous culture, thought and practice. Then we may be 
able to thoroughly analyze colonialism and its many contemporary replicants—e.g. developmentalism—
in the region. 
Thus colonialism (and developmentalism) is recognized as a process that has continuing influence 
on the Latin American and Caribbean reality—and by extension, the Global South and world at large. 
This runs in tandem with the idea of progress that continues to permeate global development. From a 
human social standpoint, the road to progress for some has been unjust to many, and continues to be. As 
economist Ha-Joon Chang points out in his concept of kicking away the ladder, once certain groups make 
their way up the ladder of economic advancement (using the labour and resources of other groups, as well 
as protectionist policies), they then kick the ladder away in order to secure their position on top (this is 
done both consciously and unconsciously), touting new principles of free trade as the best practice for the 
management of a globalized economy.8 Rooted in our idea of progress is that of competition; while we 
hear talk about steps forward for mankind, only a select few get to make the leap—the rest of us are left 
shuffling behind. 
In the face of these unequal global power dynamics have arisen proponents of autonomous, local, 
context-specific development policies and processes. Norman Girvan endorses a context-specific 
approach to policymaking that recognizes that responses to economic policy instruments are conditioned 
by a wide range of local factors.9 To this end, regionalism is positioned as a building block for a 
polycentric world system characterized by equitable development and respect for cultural diversity. This 
contribution is particularly helpful in conceiving of local, context-specific economic and policy practices 
that presents an increasingly compelling future for the world, and one of autonomy and equity for the 
Global South in particular. The discussion of “social knowledge” and the epistemic dimension of 
regionalism helps us to recognize the importance of local capacities and democratic decision-making. 
Escobar posits that the struggles for post-development in the Third World constitute arenas for 
redefining and recovering terms like equality, democracy and relations of production.10 Important in the 
imagining of post-development then is the generation of new ways of seeing and of renewing social and 
cultural self-descriptions by displacing the imposed categories of Third World groups that were 
constructed by dominant global forces, and social movements he argues, have the potential to be the most 
                                                           
8 Chang, Ha-Joon. 2003. Kicking away the Ladder: Development Strategy in Historical Perspective. London: 
Anthem Press. 
9 Girvan, Norman, and UNRISD. 2005. The Search for Policy Autonomy in the South: Universalism, Social 
Learning and the Role of Regionalism. United Nations Research Institute for Social Development.  
10 Escobar, A. (1992). Imagining a Post-Development Era? Critical Thought, Development and Social Movements. 
Social Text, (31/32), 20–56. https://doi.org/10.2307/466217  
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effective symbols of resistance and provide some paths in the direction of this call for the re-imagining of 
the “Third World” and a “post-development” era. He further posits that self-organized social movements 
are our best hope for dismantling coloniality and hegemony in such a way as to be able to finally do away 
with modernity and move beyond Third World thinking.11 This potential however, depends on the 
movements’ ability to engage with the politics of difference, especially with political strategies that are at 
the same time local and transnational. 
Here we have regional responses to the social and political consequences of the project of 
progress, modernity and development, since dominion over the earth also meant dominion of othered 
peoples. At this level, context-specific and people-centered and driven policies are necessary to overcome 
this social crisis of development. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
An Ecological-Economic Lens 
 This Pan-American socio-political framework is enhanced by an environmental-ecological lens 
when integrated with the framework of ecological economics, which seeks to reset the position of the 
economy from dominator to socially-constructed subset of the Earth-system. Based on the principal and 
interrelated tenets of Sustainable Scale, Efficient Allocation and Just Distribution, the goal is to establish 
an economic paradigm that works for both people and planet, with the hope of ameliorating many of the 
externalities, inequities and inequalities of the current system. Thinkers like Herman Daly have been 
advocating for these ideas since the 1970s, also grounded in steady-state economics which challenges the 
growth paradigm of contemporary economic development.  
 Conventional neoclassical economics as practiced around the world today, has long been centred 
around homo economicus,12 the perfectly rational individual actor seeking at all times to maximize his 
                                                           
11 Escobar, A. (2004). Beyond the Third World: Imperial Globality, Global Coloniality and Anti-Globalisation 
Social Movements. Third World Quarterly, 25(1), 207–230. 
12 Thaler, Richard, H. 2000. "From Homo Economicus to Homo Sapiens." Journal of Economic Perspectives, 14 (1): 
133-141. 
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utility above all other considerations. While homo economicus has purportedly died,13 with the 
recognition of the limited scope of economic assumptions and rationale, the lack of empirical evidence,  14 
and the emergence of fields like behavioural economics on the rise, many of the core principles of 
neoclassical economics remain very much intact: all things can be valued in monetary units; change 
happens marginally, and can be thoroughly analyzed in static, or fixed time-frames; evolution occurs as a 
process of constrained optimization; efficiency is the prime criterion for economic decision-making; and 
production processes are a matter of the allocation of fixed resources (e.g. the environment) according to 
a defined production function.15 And the Market is always right. It is easy to find the connections to the 
ideas of modernity, progress and development critiqued in the previous section.  
 
 
 
Figure 2: Conventional vs. Ecological positioning of the economy 
 
 
                                                           
13 Gintis, Herbert. 2000. "Beyond Homo economicus: evidence from experimental economics." Ecological 
economics 35, no. 3 (2000): 311-322. 
14 Henrich, Joseph, et. al. 2001. "In search of homo economicus: behavioral experiments in 15 small-scale 
societies." American Economic Review 91, no. 2 (2001): 73-78.  
15 Gowdy, John and Jon Erickson. 2005. “The Approach of Ecological Economics,” Cambridge Journal of Economics 
2005, 29, 207–222 doi:10.1093/cje/bei033  
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 Karl Polanyi observed in his work The Great Transformation, that with the historical rise of 
market capitalism, the markets emerged from being embedded in the social fabric of society, to being 
master over it.  Ecological economics seeks to re-embed economics not only into the social fabric, but 
also into the broader ecological fabric. In contrast to the aspects of conventional economics listed above, 
ecological economics: recognizes the human being as a social actor involving complex, imperfect, and 
often unpredictable internal decision-making processes; separates value into multi-criteria assessment, in 
recognition of the incommensurability of value; recognizes erratic changes amid marginal ones; allows 
for the importance of contingency, historical accidents in evolutionary change; upholds a coevolutionary 
focus to decision-making, holding up criteria such as equity, stability and the resilience of social and 
environmental systems; and understands production as a biophysical process subject to the laws of 
thermodynamics.16 
 When looking at the three interrelated principles of the ecological economics approach, we find 
some overlap with conventional economics: Efficient allocation of limited resources is a consistent object 
of all schools of thought, brought about by prices determined by supply and demand in competitive 
markets. Neoclassical economists also concern themselves over the distribution of the final goods and 
services, but in contrast with the conventional principle that distribution should be determined by ability 
to pay, ecological economists hold that good distribution is one that is just—inequality should be 
constrained to an acceptable level with transfers such as taxes and welfare payments. The difference is 
sharpened when considering scale, the physical volume of throughput (the flow of energy and materials in 
and out of the environment) driven by the economy.  Neo-classical economics has little regard for scale, 
historically disregarding the fact that Nature’s resources and sinks are not infinite, and thus cannot act just 
like any other economic sector.17 Ecological economics, on the other hand, recognizes good scale as one 
that is sustainable—that at the very least does not erode environmental carrying capacity over time, and 
that optimally would not lead to loss of ecosystem services.18  
 One final principle that is important to note with regard to ecological economics is the idea of 
limits to growth. As outlined above, at the core of this maturing school of thought is the re-positioning of 
the economy as a subset of society and the ecosphere of our planetary system at large. It naturally follows 
then, that the economy physically cannot be allowed to grow beyond the planetary bounds without 
                                                           
16 For further details, and a comparative table, see Gowdy, J. and Erickson, J.D. 2005. The approach of ecological 
economics. Cambridge Journal of Economics, Vol. 29, No. 2. 
17 It is worth noting that the neoclassical subfields of natural resource and environmental economics do not fall 
into this pattern. 
18 Daly, H.E., 1992. Allocation. distribution and scale: towards an economics that is efficient, 
just. and sustainable. Ecol. Econ., 6: 185-193. 
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wreaking havoc on the stable systems on which our species (and so many others) depend for life. 
Exceeding these limits as identified in the first section of this chapter could destabilize  the systems, 
changing them irreparably so that we no longer have a stable climate, clean air to breathe, sufficient 
freshwater resources, safe oceans, successful nitrogen and phosphorous cycles (i.e. food), ozone 
protection from harmful sun rays. And perhaps more quickly perceptibly, it will force our economies to 
contract, causing economic, social and environmental disaster. 
 In his book Managing Without Growth, Peter Victor outlines these real limits to growth and 
explores some possibilities to advance human wellbeing without increasing economic growth, 
encouraging us to find a way to slow down “by design, not disaster.”19 Finally, an interesting point to note 
about Victor’s book, is that his appeal is directed toward the Global North—as have been most if not all 
historic appeals to limit economic growth—in recognition of the unequal processes that have led to 
unequal socio-economic outcomes across the world, and the responsibility that the North has to slow 
down and allow others to at least try to catch up in terms of socioeconomic development.  
 
Protecting a Southern Right to Development 
 
 The appeal mentioned by Victor in his prologue20 is part of a decades-long debate in the Northern 
developed world over the limits to growth and how it might be managed, as nature’s capacities to contain 
our physical and ethical wastes and sustain our untenable consumption of natural resources are 
persistently overshot. The argument has been that this self-constraint in the North is particularly needed to 
leave room for those countries systematically left behind in the quest for progress and development, to be 
able to grow and provide for the material well-being of their societies (i.e. catching up) before they too 
must more seriously contend with the global situation of limits to growth. Increasingly now, however, we 
must face the discomforting fact that the space for leaving room has already been taken up in our failure 
as a global community to face the reality of a changing climate. Now the developing world must find a 
way to “develop”—to pull people out of poverty, to provide for the material wellbeing of people, (not to 
mention their happiness and fulfillment), outside of the traditional development paths, and without the 
catalyst of growth that the North has had at their disposal since the Industrial Revolution.  
 It is helpful in the first instance to truly consider the idea of the right to development despite 
climate constraints. For while we must concede the need for a new development paradigm that seeks 
                                                           
19 Victor, P. 2008 Managing without Growth 
20 Victor, P. 2008 Managing without Growth 
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ecological balance and “sustainability,” it is important to give thought to the “right to development” of the 
Global South on moral and other grounds. Taking account of the Greenhouse Development Rights 
framework,21 we are charged with the moral imperative of development in those regions of the world of 
previous (and continued) colonization. The present levels of poverty, hunger, disease, and lack of access 
to the material requirements for a “good” life are unjust in their own right, but even more so given the 
historical and continued contributions of the South to the progress and development of the North, who 
have been the biggest contributors to our climate problem in the first place. Development in this context, 
cannot be conceived of in the conventional fashion, for the reasons described earlier, in addition to the 
lack of “leaving room” left for developing countries to continue along the traditional path. While 
respecting the right to improved socio-economic conditions, the status of “developed” has to be more 
contextually, sustainably and broadly defined.  
 The GDR framework provides a means to calculate the responsibility and capacity for all 
countries, using an indicator—the Responsibility Capacity Index (RCI)— to quantify their various 
national climate obligations. Approaches such as global cap and trade, auction- and fund-based systems 
are identified as means to operationalize this framework, but of particular interest to the authors is the 
idea of a system of internationally harmonized taxes.22 This progressive capacity and responsibility based 
“climate tax” could be expressed in terms of individual capacity and responsibility, passed down to 
taxpayers according to their own personal RCIs, “thus ensuring that effort sharing within nations exactly 
parallels effort sharing among nations.”23 Intended as more of a thought experiment than a defined 
objective, this climate tax would thus cap and allocate payments for over-emission while ensuring that 
those below the “development threshold” and who contribute nothing to their nation’s obligation, would 
similarly pay nothing toward fulfilling it; “in effect, their climate tax would be zero”24 which would be 
the case for the majority of the world’s population.   
Most importantly, this framework requires the building of trust between North and South and 
action in good faith to secure climate protection, as well as the wellbeing and right to development of all, 
as advocated for by the United Nations’ Declaration of the Right to Development (UNGA 1986 
A/RES/41/128). 
                                                           
21 Kartha et. al 2010. “The Right to Development in a Climate Constrained World: The Greenhouse Development 
Rights Framework.” In Der Klimawandel, 205–226. Springer. http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-531-
92258-4_12  
22 Kartha et. al., 2010 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid. 
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A Note on Northern Responsibilities to the South 
 
 Key to securing this right to development in the Global South is support, in cash and in kind, 
from those who have overwhelmingly benefitted from the development project of the past few centuries. 
By cash and kind, I refer to cash transfers, loan instruments, debt forgiveness, technological transfers, 
technical cooperation agreements and capacity building. Much of this already occurs in the field of 
international trade, aid and development, however much more is required, and not merely for the purpose 
of charitable donations to our less fortunate global members. These transfers should not be considered as 
aid or altruistic assistance, but as a very real debt that the North owes to the South.  
Consider climate debt: Imagine the climate as a resource that all nations, people, species share, 
and into which some of the human species have released toxic greenhouse gas emissions among other 
transgressions. The atmosphere can hold only so much of these emissions before our global average 
temperatures (i.e. climate) change so much as to threaten the conditions for life that we require. So there 
is a limited amount of emissions that we can allow to be released into the atmosphere before we begin to 
seriously endanger our own lives. This limit, also called a carbon budget, has been set by the global 
community to the amount of emissions that would cause the global average temperature to rise to 2 
degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels. It is estimated to be around one trillion tonnes of carbon, or 
1000 PgC.; at current rates, we will exceed this budget by the end of year 2045.25  
According to climate science, if we pass that 2-degree mark, we will face “untold calamity” with 
regards to the stability of the climate and our conditions for life. This calamity extends from increased 
risk of sea level rise, forest fires, water shortages that we will surely face at this point, even if we do 
remain within budget. If we exceed this budget, and pass the 2 degree mark, these risks are significantly 
increased with every degree of warming beyond 2 degrees: global sea levels could rise by 1 meter in 
2100; the intensity and frequency of wildfires will increase; heavy precipitation will increase over some 
land areas; the duration and intensity of droughts will also increase in many regions.26 Heat waves will 
last longer, crop yields will fall, and coral bleaching will put virtually all reefs at risk.27 These biophysical 
dangers will then have extensive impacts on our socio-economic systems, as food and water become 
increasingly insecure, climate migration intensifies, and economic constraints will tighten.  
 The argument continues on the premise that these limited emissions, or carbon budget, is a 
resource pool that everyone should have equal access to, so there’s only so much emissions that we’re 
                                                           
25 World Resources Institute, IPCC infographics http://www.wri.org/ipcc-infographics  
26 Ibid.  
27 Carbon Brief, https://www.carbonbrief.org/scientists-compare-climate-change-impacts-at-1-5c-and-2c  
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each allowed.28 And based on population size, there’s only so much emissions that each country is 
allowed. What has happened so far is that some countries have already used up their fair allotment of 
these emissions. If we imagined this shared pool as a budget then, the countries who have used up more 
than their fair share owe their over-emissions to those who haven’t. [Remember, we can’t allow the global 
average temperature to pass that 2-degree mark.] Thus, we have debtors (overwhelmingly Northern) who 
owe their extra use—their debt—to the creditors (overwhelmingly Southern) who, due to a combination 
of choice and structural exploitation, have not used up their fair share. And now they will not be able to so 
without compromising our 2-degree target.  
 Hence the argument is that we have climate debtors and we have climate creditors, and the 
debtors have to find a way to pay their debt to the creditors. From this premise, the creditors in the South 
have a right to emissions, a right which has been impinged upon by the over-emission in the North. In the 
regions of the world with the greatest poverty, hunger, instability and vulnerability, we must acknowledge 
a right to development  in order to provide for the material needs of those excluded from globalized 
“progress.” In many ways, this right to development means a right to continued emissions, so added to the 
context of climate debt, where only a limited amount of global emissions can be allowed, the urgency and 
imperative for this debt to be paid only increases as our global average temperature increases. 
 According to the work undertaken by Damon Matthews on Climate Debt calculations,29 the 
United States alone owes the world USD $4 trillion dollars in climate debt. Defining climate debts as the 
amount by which national climate contributions have exceeded a hypothetical equal per-capita share over 
time, Matthews’ calculations are based on supply-side (i.e. production-based) accounting of emissions, 
calculating the accumulation of ‘carbon debts’ for each country since 1960, using historical estimates of 
national fossil fuel CO2 emissions and population.
30 Counting from 1990, since this was when we first 
found a verifiable link between carbon emissions and climate change,31 and is thus the least contestable 
measure of the debt, US has taken up 32% of the cumulative global climate debt from 1990-2010. Canada 
is also a significant debtor country at 3.9% of the world climate debt, meaning that Canada owes the 
world USD $500 billion—no small debt by any means. Compare that number to the combined external 
debt stock of “low and middle income” countries as of 2015 according to the World Bank: USD $6.669 
                                                           
28 This is based on the first Rawlsian principle of distributive justice, where basic liberties are to be enjoyed by each 
citizen to an equal extent. [Rawls, J. (2009). A theory of justice. Harvard university press; Rawls, J. (1985). Justice as 
fairness: Political not metaphysical. Philosophy & Public Affairs, 223-251.] 
29 Brian Merchant, “The U.S. Owes the World $4 Trillion for Trashing the Climate,” Vice News, September 15, 
2015. https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/bmj97q/the-us-owes-the-world-4-trillion-for-trashing-the-climate 
30 Matthews, H. D. (2016). Quantifying historical carbon and climate debts among nations. Nature climate change, 
6(1), 60. 
31 Ibid.   
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trillion,32 and isn’t hard to see who the true global debtors and creditors are (not to mention other 
historical debts like slavery, biopiracy, resource exploitation, ecosystem degradation and pollution).  
Furthermore, the average citizen in Toronto or Texas has not derived significant personal 
financial gain from the activities that are overwhelmingly the cause of the problem—while Northern 
consumers have benefitted from their governments’ climate credit—it is the petrochemical industries 
more than citizen-taxpayers who ought to be called upon to settle their debts. After all, in the North, many 
communities—Native ones in particular—suffer from local “externalities” of extraction such as oil spills, 
air pollution, and their many negative environmental and human health effects.   
  
 What is needed is an autonomous, ecologically sound vision of development determined by local 
communities, and aided by international debt payments.
                                                           
32 World Bank Data Portal, http://data.worldbank.org/topic/external-debt?locations=XO&view=chart, accessed 
June 2017 
 24 
The Rights of Nature 
 
In September 2008, Ecuador became the first country in the world to constitutionally (and legally) 
recognize the “Rights of Nature”  in the ratification by referendum of its newest constitution. In 
April 2010, the World People’s Conference on Climate Change and the Rights of Mother Earth 
held in Bolivia resulted in the Universal Declaration of the Rights of Mother Earth. Later that year, 
Bolivia’s Legislative Assembly passed the Law of the Rights of Mother Earth; these rights were 
further recognized in statutory law the following year. In 2014, the government of New Zealand 
passed the Te Urewera Act, legally recognizing the former national park in its own right; and in 
2017, finalized the Te Awa Tupua Act, which grants the Whanganui River legal status as an 
ecosystem.33 
 
These developments and others around the world have been ignited and carried to fruition through 
the collective action of Indigenous and other local peoples, brokering with their governments on 
behalf of Nature to secure rights to the ecosystem that has made the flourishing of our species 
possible.  
 
Article 10 of the Ecuadorian Constitution now extends the rights entitlements normally held 
exclusively by people to Nature, and its seventh chapter is dedicated to the Rights of Nature. 
Article 71 declares that: “Nature, or Pachamama, where life is reproduced and exists, has the right 
to exist, persist, maintain and regenerate its vital cycles, structure, functions and its processes in 
evolution.”34 The Chapter further ensures the right of nature to restoration, protection, and of the 
ability of people and communities to defend these rights.  
The first lawsuit filed under these constitutional provisions took place in 2011, with the 
Vilcabamba River as plaintiff, defending its right to exist and maintain itself in the face of a 
highway construction project that was disturbing the natural flow and health of the river. The 
Provincial Court of Justice ruled in the river’s favour, ordering that the project be stopped.35  
 
The Bolivian Law of the Rights of Mother Earth entitles nature to the rights: to life, to the diversity 
of live, to water, to clean air, to equilibrium, to restoration, and to freedom from contamination.36 
The law further outlines the duties and obligations of the state and of society to ensure these rights. 
 
Much of this Rights of Nature rhetoric has been inspired by the Buen Vivir (also Vivir Bien/Sumak 
Kawsay/Suma Qamaña) or Living Well philosophy of wellbeing which is based on the Indigenous 
worldview which holds that nature, community and individual are intrinsically interconnected and 
made up of the same material and spiritual matter. Particular to the Indigenous communities of 
Ecuador and Bolivia, the institutionalization of Buen Vivir and the Rights of Nature present an 
excellent examples of state institutionalization of an alternative “development” discourse that aims 
to repair and reorient the human relationship with each other and with Nature. While inspirational, 
these initiatives are not immune from limitations and challenges in implementation in an 
increasingly globalized world. Still, they offer points for consideration and frameworks for 
application in the Caribbean and around the world.  
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Chapter 2: Contextualizing the Caribbean 
 
HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
  
The Caribbean is a region unique to the world and difficult to define. The first stops of the 
European ships headed for the New World, the Caribbean played a role of strategic importance during 
colonial struggles. From the Spanish enslavement, exploitation and massacre of Indigenous peoples 
across the region in the hunt for gold and other resources; to the enslavement and importation of African 
people to continue mining labour; to the European imperial rivalries played out in the capture of 
Caribbean gateway territories, to the establishment of plantation economies for the production of sugar, 
cocoa and coffee; and the continued capture and importation of millions of enslaved Africans. After 
emancipation, facing huge labour shortages on the plantations, indentureship agreements brought people 
from India, China, Indonesia to counter the economic losses of emancipation. Throughout this period 
many other people seeking better opportunities also emigrated to the region from parts of Europe and the 
Middle East, adding even more to the mix of peoples.37, 38, 39 
 There are two major consequences of this history that are important to understand if one hopes to 
contextualize the contemporary state of affairs: 
Firstly, this distinctive past has resulted in the Caribbean as “all the world in one place;” a small 
region hosting a diverse plurality of language and ethnicity, religion and culture, long before the word 
“multiculturalism” entered the Western lexicon in the twentieth century. Due to its history of 
colonization, shared in part with the wider Latin American and Caribbean region and the Americas as a 
whole, this region presents “a case unique to the entire planet: a vast zone for which mestizaje is not an 
accident but rather the essence, the central line.”40 From the Spanish, mestizaje, to the French creolité, to 
the anglicized idea of creoleness, this (forced) diasporic condition is not a mere detail of the 
contemporary social fabric, but a central defining characteristic of the Caribbean and out of which 
Caribbean social thought emerged.41 Different peoples torn from their native lands (and encountering few 
                                                           
37 Williams, Eric. 1971. From Columbus to Castro: The History of the Caribbean 1492–1969. New York: Random 
House 
38 Martin, Tony. 2012. Caribbean History: From Pre-colonial Origins to the Present. Taylor & Francis: NYC, NY. 
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if any native peoples upon their arrival) had to face, over centuries, the challenge of “disadjustment and 
readjustment, of deculturation and acculturation—in a word, of transculturation.”42 And thus we have this 
continuous process of creolization, where the outcome of the combination of cultures is like offspring, 
having always something from both parents, but also always being different from each of them. There is 
no unified ideology of creolity43 or of self, nor any truly native Caribbean point of view, but rather a 
heterogenous mosaic of ideas of how to move forward into the future together.  
Secondly, the development of the colonial Caribbean as peripheral plantation economies with the 
sole purpose of providing raw materials for export to the colonial bases has consequences for the 
contemporary management of the economy and society. The colonial powers saw no benefit in 
developing local economies; the colony’s purpose was to produce and export the raw material that would 
then be manufactured into final goods in Europe; any required resources for the maintenance of society 
would be imported, leaving a lasting trend in Caribbean economies. Socio-politically as well as 
economically, the region was designed to be externally driven;  
“The Plantations, entities turned in upon themselves, paradoxically, have all the symptoms of 
extroversion. They are dependent, by nature, on someplace elsewhere. In their practice of 
importing and exporting, the established politics is not decided from within.”44   
 
And so we have the peculiar context of a region that is extremely vulnerable due to history and 
geography, to external shocks, events, policies and economic demand, and that was structured to serve a 
foreign center, the effects of which remain in the outward-looking application of foreign systems and 
solutions to local problems, all despite possessing a unique social reality rich in plurality and 
heterogeneity that demands—like all other places—the development of locally-driven and designed 
context-specific solutions and ideas for “development.” 
Defining, or rather delineating the Caribbean poses the challenge of multiple definitions that 
include and exclude various territories.   
Geologically speaking, the Caribbean is the area that rests upon the relatively small Caribbean 
tectonic plate, bordered by the North American, South American, Nazco and Coco plates. This area 
expresses similar tectonic, seismic and volcanic features and processes: it is a known earthquake zone that 
shares an annual hurricane season from June to November, and is rife with volcanic activity in the Lesser 
                                                           
42 Ortiz, Fernando. 1947. “Cuban Counterpoint: Tobacco and Sugar (excerpts)” in “Fernando Ortiz” The Birth of 
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Antilles in particular. This delineation implies that the Caribbean extends from Hispaniola in the North, to 
parts of Trinidad and Tobago, Venezuela and Colombia in the South, and from Central America in the 
West to just East of the Lesser Antilles in the East. Geographically, the Caribbean is defined as the area 
surrounding the Caribbean Sea, known as the Caribbean Basin area. This area would include all parts of 
the geologic Caribbean, plus Cuba, and parts of Mexico. 
Historical definitions of the Caribbean would group the territories according to shared colonial 
experiences, and this often also refers to shared official languages. We would also then include Guyana 
and Suriname in this definition, and group the territories as being either former British, Spanish, French 
or Dutch colonies. It is important to note, however that various territories experienced multiple European 
powers in control during the colonial period, which has consequences for local culture and language. For 
instance, in Curacao, while the official language is Dutch, many people also speak Papamiento, English 
and Spanish; in Trinidad while the official language is English, the local creole is originally French-
rooted; and on the Caribbean coasts of Nicaragua, Honduras, Belize and Guatemala, the Garifuna45 people 
speak an indigenous-based language influenced by Spanish, English and French. 
Political delineations would categorize Caribbean territories as either: (1) Independent States, 
which are now self-governing, though not all independent states are republics, leaving the Queen of 
England as de-facto head of state in a number of previously British territories; (2) Associated States, 
which are not independent, but enjoy all of the rights and privileges of the country governing it (e.g. 
Puerto Rico); and (3) Colonial Dependencies,  which are those directly governed by another country and 
do not enjoy all the rights and privileged enjoyed by those living in the governing country (e.g. 
Martinique, Guadeloupe, French Guyana (France); Cayman Islands, Turks and Caicos, Bermuda, British 
Virgin Islands (UK)).  
Politically, the Caribbean can also be defined according to various supranational organizations, 
further exhibiting the complexity of defining the Caribbean, such as: CARICOM (Caribbean Community) 
whose objective is to promote economic integration and co-operation, and which includes all prior and 
current British colonies in the Caribbean, as well as Haiti, Suriname, and a number of Observer members 
with Spanish and Dutch histories of colonization (15 full members, 5 associate, 8 observers). The 
Association of Caribbean States (ACS) has the purpose of developing greater trade, transportation, 
tourism, and disaster response among members. It includes all territories of the Caribbean Basin, that is, 
CARICOM plus the Central and South American states that have Caribbean coastlines (25 full, 7 
associate members). The Organization of Eastern Caribbean States is associated with CARICOM, and 
                                                           
45 Also referred to by colonial masters as Black Caribs, the Garifuna are a people of mixed indigenous and 
African ancestry who were exiled from the islands of the Lesser Antilles for revolting, and who settled along 
the coast of Central America. 
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includes ten Eastern Caribbean territories that form almost a continuous archipelago across the Leeward 
and Windward Islands. Many Caribbean states are also members of CELAC, the Community of Latin 
American and Caribbean States, created to counter the US hegemony in the Organization of American 
States (yet another regional association including Caribbean states).  
While holding a broader view of the Caribbean, I will tend in this paper to focus on those full 
members of CARICOM as the most established “Caribbean” association, and those territories that are 
overwhelmingly implied in political narratives of the Caribbean as a region.
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SOCIO-ECONOMIC OVERVIEW 
 
 The most pressing contemporary development challenges for small-island developing states stem 
for the most part from their particular vulnerabilities such as: remoteness, small size, limited resources 
and narrow export bases, and significant exposure to external economic shocks and global environmental 
challenges, which include a large range of climate change impacts and increasingly frequent and intense 
natural disasters.46 Sea level rise poses the challenge of territory loss, especially for smaller low-lying 
islands. Poverty reduction and debt sustainability continue to be major economic challenges, with few 
advances in the last twenty years. Social progress in areas such as gender, health and education have been 
achieved, but more work is needed. Though trends vary considerably across the Caribbean, most states 
continue to struggle with poor economic growth and fiscal management, high and increasing debt, and a 
lack of economic diversification. While the performance of tourism-dependent states has improved 
somewhat, that of those that are resource dependent remains tenuous.47 
  Socially, there has been significant progress in the Caribbean with regard to access to basic 
social services, especially education and water and sanitation. Near universal access to primary education 
has been achieved in most countries, with net enrolment ratios of over 90%, with similar results for access 
to water and sanitation facilities in both urban and rural areas in the region.48 Despite these advances, 
however there remains much to be done to achieve and sustain the quality of life to which the region 
aspires. Unemployment for instance remains quite high, amidst persistent high rates of poverty and 
unemployment.  
 Economic performance over the last twenty years has been sluggish due to the Great Recession of 
2008, an increasing number and severity of natural disasters, and high levels of indebtedness. While the 
economic growth forecasted for the world economy for 2018 is looking up at 3.9%, and 2% in the Latin 
American and Caribbean region, the Caribbean is looking at an improved though still low 1.8% growth 
amid continuing vulnerability.49 This level of growth lags behind that of other small-island developing 
states (SIDS), who saw 4.8% growth in 2017.50 The average growth rate per capita in the Caribbean, a 
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measure of economic prosperity, is equally low at 1.7% at the end of 2017. The level required to achieve 
the eighth Sustainable Development Goal (SDG #8)—"to promote sustained, inclusive & sustainable 
economic growth, full & productive employment, decent work for all”—is 7% per year by 2030 for least 
developed countries. 
The Caribbean is one of the most indebted regions in the world, with the gross public debt as a 
percentage of GDP currently at 74.8% in 2017, down from 78% in 2016. This affects the economies’ 
ability to buffer against external shocks, while the impact of climate change and natural disasters 
continues to magnify the macroeconomic problems in the region. Tourism-dependent territories are 
seeing general improvements as the US, Canadian and British economies pick up, while also benefitting 
from the low prices of crude oil and increased remittances from abroad. Resource-dependent countries on 
the other hand, are suffering from the fall in commodity prices as we come to the end of the global 
commodity cycle.51  
While the outlook is beginning to improve for commodity exporters and further improvements 
are expected, fiscal challenges remain significant. Pronounced gaps remain in data quality and availability 
which limits the prospects for meaningful analysis and dialogue, and evidence-based decision-making, 
though overall macroeconomic data is relatively robust. The business environment is currently stymied by 
high transaction costs, lengthy processing times, burdensome procedures with respect to opening new 
businesses, and high electricity costs.52 A concerted effort is required in order to improve the business 
environment through the removal of barriers to trade and investment. According to the Caribbean and 
Inter-American Development Banks, this will need to be accompanied by the appropriate regulatory and 
policy frameworks, and rooted in the improved efficiency of public sector institutions that are aimed at 
creating an enabling environment for business development. The dilemmas to target, according to the 
regional development banks involved, are those of high debt, low growth and climate change, which are 
encompassed in a balance between economic prosperity and ecological sustainability. 
To secure these more effective measures, a visioning process that is at least partly shared across 
the public, private and NGO sectors is imperative, with public participation the likes of which has yet to 
be seen in the region embraced. While aiming at these ‘global standard’ targets for economic 
development, the socio-cultural context of the region needs to be engaged, towards a context-specific, 
home-grown vision for the future, in addition to a fundamental acknowledgement of the need to do away 
with the primacy of economic growth. Greater public service efficiency and streamlining and improved 
                                                           
51 Inter-American Development Bank, June 2018 
52 Caribbean Development Bank, 2017 
 31 
data collection must be part of a larger Caribbean-specific framework for development: prosperity and 
resilience. 
 
ENVIRONMENTAL CHALLENGES 
  
 Focusing on the small-island developing states in the region, ecologically the Caribbean lies 
within a tropical hurricane belt, covers nearly two million square kilometers, averages 2,200 metres in 
depth (and plunging to 7,100 metres in the Cayman trench), receives run-off from eight major river 
systems, contains well developed seasonally stratified marine waters, and at least one dead zone. The 
islands themselves vary in size from 91 square kilometers in Anguilla to Cuba’s 110,860 square 
kilometers, with highly varied topographies and geology, including low-lying limestone and coral reef 
atolls, volcanic outcrops and diverse local flora and fauna. Their coastal ecosystems are a mixture of 
mangrove, sea-grasses and coral reefs while the terrestrial ecosystems are made up of thirty-four 
ecoregions all with high levels of endemism—species unique to these islands. The freshwater supply is 
highly varied, from Jamaica ranked as the SIDS with the most abundant freshwater supply, to Barbados 
being one of the world’s most arid countries.53 
The experience of environmental change and challenges is more pronounced in SIDS compared 
to the rest of the world due to their small physical scale, geographic isolation, unique biodiversity, 
exposure to natural hazards and disasters, high population growth coupled with out- migration and 
significant seasonal in-migration from tourism, limited resource base, remoteness from global markets 
and small economies of scale.54 In addition to global economic stagnation and population growth, there 
are various other drivers and pressures affecting SIDS’ outlook: “vulnerability to climate change, local 
access to water, nutrition and food security, energy and transport demand, exploitation of natural 
resources, local sectoral development, poor management of waste and pollution, coastal squeeze and loss 
of ecological resilience and a range of emerging issues, such as social disintegration, and in some 
instances the disappearance of their national territory.55 
While it is a region that produces marginal emissions relative to the rest of the world (less than 
one percent of global greenhouse gas emissions), it faces a disproportionate brunt of the effects of global 
warming and climate change. These threats include sea level rise, extreme storm events and droughts, 
                                                           
53 UNEP 2014. GEO Small Island Developing States Outlook. United Nations Environment Programme, 
Nairobi, Kenya. 
54 Ibid.  
55 Ibid.  
 32 
coastal erosion, inundation, saltwater intrusion into groundwater systems, coral bleaching, ecosystem 
destruction, ocean acidification, adverse effects on crops and fisheries and increases in vector-borne 
diseases,56 all of which affect Caribbean SIDS to varying degrees.  
To address these issues, and the socio-economic challenges related to them, SIDS need to act 
quickly and cooperatively, in partnership with each other and the global community, to reduce the 
impacts of environmental change and to build resilience in the face of all of their unique challenges. 
Needed action spans from the explicitly environmental, to the economic, social, spheres, addressing 
governance and policy limitations and the need for financing and investment in renewables, 
infrastructure, and social needs. In fact, the unique situation of the Caribbean and other SIDS presents a 
great opportunity for innovation labs, to first address urgent local needs, and which can then be 
transplanted to address challenges around the world.  
 
LAND-USE PLANNING AND CHANGE IN THE CARIBBEAN 
 
 Like much else in the region, planning in the Caribbean has a consistent history of foreign-
imported policies and practices, from colonial transplantation under British rule, to externally determined 
policies post-independence, finally to a newly emerging era of locally designed frameworks based on a 
home context. The former Spanish colonies (Cuba, Dominican Republic, Puerto Rico) had different and 
earlier experiences of independence, allowing for a longer history of self-determined planning, while 
many of the French and Dutch colonies still remain under colonial mandate today, with the exception of 
Suriname, whose trajectory more closely resembles that of the former British colonies, and Haiti with its 
own long, rich and well-known history.  
 Focusing on the anglophone Caribbean islands, also known as the West Indies, this sub-region 
shares legacies of British colonization that have influenced national planning processes, frameworks and 
institutions into the present day: From a lack of any planning following emancipation in the 1840s—to 
the adoption of the English 1932 Town and Country Act in the late 1930s as means of expediency in 
response to unrest over poor housing and infrastructure, and the need to maintain colony loyalty during 
WWII57—to the pressures of newly independent states seeking legitimacy and economic stability, merely 
copying systems from other places and contexts; the challenge of planning in the Caribbean is by no 
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means a new issue. Following the demise of the Washington Consensus and the evidence of largely 
ineffective aspirational declarations rather than context-specific plans with real means of implementation, 
Caribbean governments now find themselves in need of new planning mechanisms, practices, policies and 
visions.  
 Current planning challenges in the region include: rapid urbanization, urban sprawl, urban 
informality, environmental degradation, inefficient infrastructure, and poor access to basic services.58 
Furthermore, less than ten percent of the urban landscape is in compliance with zoning regulations and 
building standards. Many of these regulations face strong public criticism for their rigidity and 
exorbitance, based on outmoded and irrelevant planning legislation and codes all too reminiscent of 
colonial times. Ever since those first planning acts were passed under British rule, local elites have 
continued to re-appropriate, adapt and mediate Western planning processes, in many cases to secure and 
expand their own power at the expense of local planning expertise, which has thus been marginalized.  
 Since then, many physical plans and other planning documents, in addition to projects for 
multilateral financing, were created by foreign consultants despite advancements in local human resource 
capacity building. These plans were generally accepted by political administrators without reservation, 
and without sufficient review, and were rarely implemented due to little grasp of the sociopolitical 
culture. More recently, however, local elites across the region have begun to embrace the popular appeal 
to context-specific local solutions to local problems, though an agreed national framework for 
development is still overwhelmingly lacking in the physical planning systems, thereby limiting their 
capacity to effectively respond to external policies for gaining loan financing, and maintaining 
ambiguities that allow politicians to make decisions to attract foreign investments at any and all costs.  
 Administrative deficiencies, changing economic trends and political expediency have undermined 
spatial planning. In most territories, as noted by Mycoo (2017), political interference from the office of 
the Prime Minister can halt and spur on planning making and enforcement, while most Ministers of 
Planning cannot be held accountable for planning decisions.  Within development control, approval 
processes are tedious, encouraging bribery and corruption, and  enforcement is problematic and suffers 
from limited capacities.  
 A technical, top-down and expert-driven approach still very much characterizes the practice of 
land-use planning, relying on the old “neutralist” ideology that planning is purely a technical exercise, 
while the customary form of master planning—largely ineffective aspirational declarations—has yet to 
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catch up to current trends that emphasize governance, decentralization and democratization. It is evident 
in any reading of strategic Plans in the region—from CARICOM at the regional level, to national 
development plans—that for the most part they embody a “regime analysis”59 whereby effective 
governance depends upon the cooperation of nongovernmental actors, and on the combination of state 
capacity with nongovernmental resources. Here state, private sector, non-governmental organizations and 
other social institutions and leaders operate as a regime that co-operates and leads the development of the 
city/nation.  
 Policy preferences are recognized as being relatively fluid, requiring public consultation and 
participation in the initial stages of identifying the most pressing needs of the community, and they do 
seem to be influenced by perceived feasibility, as resource constraints are frequently referred to in the 
challenges to achieving the stated objectives. Just as the literature of the urban regime analysis theory, 
points out, limitations abound in the political economy focus that sidelines the agency of the social sphere 
in society, and in the need for alternatives to corporate-centered development strategies.60  
The degree to which participation is engendered varies, with Barbados’ “people-centred 
development” pointing to a potential evolution from regime analysis to the right to the city (nation), 
where political, social and class struggles are recognized as inherent in the processes of the state. 61 For 
now, there is increasing recognition that the success of planning depends on public buy-in, requiring 
deeper public participation in order to avoid the present state of public resistance to plans and lack of trust 
in the planning process.  
Many of the strategies and objectives identified align with Mycoo’s assertion of the need for the 
use of market incentives, the reform of outdated legal regimes and traditional bureaucratic cultures, and 
the strengthening of government commitment. Still missing however, is a devolution of planning 
functions and better coordination across functions, sectors and scales. Furthermore, the mainstreaming of 
environmental and resilience efforts into national planning and development policies is yet to be fully 
realized,62 in order to truly integrate climate action with development goals.63 
                                                           
59 Stone, Clarence. 1993. “Urban Regimes and the Capacity to Govern: A Political Economy Approach” Journal of 
Urban Affairs 15.1. E-Resources. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Harvey, David. 2012. Rebel cities: from the right to the city to the urban revolution. Verso Books. Section One 
“The Right to the City”: 3-66. 
62 Pelling, Mark, and Juha I. Uitto. 2001. “Small Island Developing States: Natural Disaster Vulnerability and 
Global Change.” Environmental Hazards 3 (2):49–62. 
63 Janetos, Anthony C., et. al. 2012. “Linking Climate Change and Development Goals: Framing, Integrating, and 
Measuring.” Climate and Development 4 (2):141–56. https://doi.org/10.1080/17565529.2012.726195. 
 35 
 
The Caribbean’s unique history and biophysical reality, in addition to the challenging economic 
situation, require innovative action, coordination and investment in order to secure prosperity today and 
resilience in the face of tomorrow’s trials. Planning practice and governance need to evolve to serve these 
needs in a region that is ready to through off the yoke of colonial and other foreign structures and 
determine for itself how to develop processes and solutions to local problems. With the continuing 
expansion and improvement of education across the region, there is growing cadre of capable human 
resources who need to be consulted, included participants of the planning process in order to navigate 
through the challenges of the twenty-first century.  
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The Blue Economy 
 
Covering 71% of the Earth’s surface, containing 97% of the planet’s water and 99% of its living space,64 the 
world’s oceans are critical to most if not all forms of life on this Blue Planet. Over 3.1 billion people live within 
100 km of the ocean or sea in about 150 coastal and island nations;65 fish provide 4.3 billion people with about 
15 percent of their intake of animal protein;66 and around 880 million people depend on the fisheries and 
aquaculture sector for their livelihoods.67 Oceans and seas are the waterways for our global trade system, with 
more than 90 percent of global trade carried by sea,68 and global ocean economic activity is estimated to be 
between 3 and 5 trillion US dollars.69 Furthermore, our oceans provide vital ecosystem services, serve as a 
growing source of renewable energy, and make crucial contributions to global food production and food security 
through the provision of food, minerals and nutrients.70 
 
Thus it comes as no surprise that for small island and coastal developing states, the ocean’s role as a critical 
provider of nourishment and income is even more magnified, as the areas in the world most reliant on coastal and 
maritime economies for livelihoods, income and employment, and having jurisdiction over marine space typically 
far exceeding their equivalent land mass.71 Therefore there is a great opportunity in this area for SIDS to utilize 
marine resources in the transformation of their productive bases, to secure livelihoods, eradicate insecurities of 
poverty, food and energy, and to achieve long-term sustainable development goals.  
 
The blue economy concept provides a framework to achieve sustainable development objectives through the 
sustainable use of ocean, sea and coastal resources. Arising from the Rio +20 2012 UN Conference on Sustainable 
Development, the blue economy offers new avenues for sustainable development, adapting features of the green 
economy (environmental sustainability, fairness in the use of resources), applied in the context of ocean and 
maritime resources. The framework was further enshrined in the UN Sustainable Development Goals through 
SDG #14: “Conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas and marine resources for sustainable development.”72  
The blue economy concept consists of four main themes: 
1. Sustainable and inclusive growth and development; 
2. Reducing the risk of over exploitation and risky methods of extraction/usage of the ocean’s resources; 
3. Enhancing the welfare of coastline communities in terms of economic opportunities and social protection;  
4. Ensuring resilience of countries to natural disasters and the impact of climate change.73 
 
In the Caribbean, Grenada is at the forefront of the blue economy economic transformation, with a Blue Growth 
Coastal Master Plan that identifies opportunities for  blue growth development in fisheries and agriculture, blue 
biotechnology, renewable energy, research and innovation. It proposes a ‘Blue Innovation Institute’ to act as a 
research think tank, and seeks to develop innovative blue financing instruments such as debt-for-nature swaps, 
blue bonds, blue insurance and blue impact investment schemes.74 Thus the “Spice Isle” is positioning itself as 
the pioneer of a new blue growth model, leading the way for its neighbours and the world at large.  
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Chapter 3: Planning and Development for Complex Systems 
 
 As was aptly stated by the United Nations Environment Programme, in reference to small-island 
developing states: “Each island is part of a complex, integrated system binding human society with nature 
and the economy.”75 In this chapter, we will review the central tenets of systems thinking as outlined by 
Capra and Luisi in The Systems View of Life76 and the applications of this perspective to planning for 
development in Caribbean SIDS. Systems thinking is central to the shift in perspective of our place in the 
Earth system, and of our understanding the myriad processes around us, so that our solutions may be 
more comprehensive and contextual, given a more comprehensive and contextual understanding of our 
problems and challenges. 
 
THINKING IN SYSTEMS 
 The most general characteristic of systems-thinking is the shift in perspective from the parts to 
the whole. Organic systems are unified wholes whose properties cannot be reduced to those of its smaller 
parts. Firstly, the essential properties of the system as a whole do not lie in its parts; rather, they arise 
from the patterns of organization—the structure of the systems as a whole.77 Second is the inherent 
multidisciplinarity of systems-thinking; all living systems share a set of common attributes and principles 
of organization, meaning that this perspective can be applied to discover similarities between phenomena, 
and to integrate distinct academic disciplines.78 Thirdly is the shift from focus on objects or parts to 
relationships: objects are themselves networks of relationships embedded in ever-larger networks of 
relationships. Instead of the primacy of parts, systems-thinking moves the primacy to the relationships 
between components.79 
 Fourth is the shift from measuring to mapping; relationships cannot be measured like objects, 
instead they must be mapped. Thus this change is an inherent result of the shift from the primacy of 
objects to relationships, requiring also a change in methodology. As relationships are mapped, patterns 
can be detected, such as the networks, cycles and boundaries at the centre of attention in systems 
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science.80 Fifth is the further requisite shift from quantities to qualities as mapping relationships and 
studying patterns is qualitative rather than quantitative.81 Sixth, we find the shift from structures to 
processes. Whereas conventional Cartesian science recognizes fundamental structures that then give rise 
to processes, in systems science, every structure is but a manifestation of some underlying processes. 
Living systems contain continuous flows of matter that simultaneously maintain their structures, thus the 
processes of these flows are more decisive than their structures.82  
 Science itself then shifts from an objective to epistemic enterprise since epistemology (the 
understanding of the process of knowing) must be explicitly included in the description of phenomena.  
No human undertaking, including science, can be independent of the human observer and the human 
process of knowing—a subjective dimension is always involved. Finally, is the shift from certainty to 
approximation. If everything is connected to everything else then it would be incredibly difficult to fully, 
comprehensively understand anything with absolute certainty—one would have to understand literally 
everything first; we are always dealing with limited and approximate knowledge.83  
 What is most important to understand from this rubric, is that like Nature, our major problems are 
also systemic; everything is not isolated but is interconnected and interdependent—the universe, life 
itself, as well as our major problems, and their solutions, are complex systems. Reducing these systems to 
their parts, while helping us to understand how they work, will not bring about systemic and sustainable 
solutions on their own. Everything we are dealing with is relational and qualitative, and our understanding 
of them is inherently epistemic and approximate. The process of development is thus not merely 
economic but also social, ecological, cultural, ethical, even spiritual. It is multidimensional and 
qualitative. Thus part of our problem is a crisis in perception of the world around us, in which we were 
are materially embedded. It then follows that our solutions must be systemic if they are to be viable and 
successful. 
 Changing the paradigm will involve many contemporary and yet-to-come advances such as the 
redesign of the corporation and globalization itself, advancing awareness of climate change, weaning 
ourselves off of fossil fuels and redesigning energy and energy-dependent human systems (e.g. 
transportation), developing agroecology, and other eco-design technologies and initiatives.84 There is an 
current surge in these schemes, but their ultimate success in comprehensively addressing our issues in the 
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long run will depend on the systemic nature of their design and implementation, not to mention being 
grounded in the principles of ecological sustainability. 
 
PLANNING FOR COMPLEX SYSTEMS 
 In understanding the world around us as complex and systemic, it naturally follows that cities, 
regions and nation-states are also complex, adaptive, self-organizing systems—especially since they are 
in fact, the product of human activity. Through our individual behaviour and decisions, and the collective 
decision-making of communities, developers, governments, and planning and other authorities, we alter 
and expand our cities, regions and nation-states to satisfy our range of needs and wants. Each individual 
decision is made in its own context of constraints and prior decisions, but in the end, the overall structure 
of the built environment as a whole emerges out of the aggregate of all of these decisions without anyone 
specifically deciding the entire structure. It is in this way that it is self-organizing; “the city creates 
itself.”85  
The role of planning then, is not to prescribe the structure of our physical environment, but rather, 
in understanding its complex, self-organizing nature, to guide the process of development towards desired 
societal outcomes. The practice of planning varies from place to place, and in many locales, land use 
planning can be absent or ineffective, as is evident in the Caribbean where only a small fraction of 
development actually conforms to code.86 To improve these outcomes, spatial planning needs to be based 
on a realistic understanding of the spatial dynamic of urban and regional development. Then planning 
efforts would be able to guide the development process in directions that are feasible, desirable and 
adaptive.  
Key to this is the use of models that embody complex systems scenarios—complex systems 
models that can enrich our understanding of the built environment while also broadening our awareness 
of the possibilities and limitations of the models themselves. As the modelling process is repeated, 
modified, expanded, our confidence in their viability improves, as does our understanding of the 
phenomena being modelled.  
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Modelling techniques and software like the one used in Part 2 of this paper87 are able to pair the 
empirical with the subjective, as feedback between the model and the modeller (the modeller’s 
perceptions shape the model’s design, which generates certain outcomes, which then further affects the 
modeller’s perceptions, and round again) and other users generate improved understanding of the 
phenomena under study, affecting academic, professional and public discourse about the issues 
highlighted. Complex systems models make it possible to explore alternatives and different potential 
futures, which can prove to be indispensable to planners, policymakers and even communities to assess 
decision options up for debate. Software like the one used in Part 2 of this paper is particularly applicable 
in a broad/public sense, as its algorithm generates the equations that make the model design possible, thus 
not requiring any extensive mathematical or statistical—or technical—knowledge for use. In this way, 
community-based, participatory planning processes and systems (like the one covered in the next section) 
are enhanced and strengthened. 
As we are better able to understand and envision the systems in motion around us, our planning 
efforts become increasingly more effective and successful.  
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PARTICIPATION AND MODEL MEDIATION 
 The other important element in the modelling-planning process is the degree of participation of 
the stakeholders involved in the system or process under analysis. Without deep stakeholder participation, 
planning is left as an expert-driven technocratic exercise with the problems of lack of public buy-in and 
ultimately, limited or failed implementation. Participation exists on a spectrum of involvement. In a 
modelling process this can range from individual stakeholder consultation in the modelling process, to an 
interactive team learning experience where a group of stakeholders has complete control over the type of 
modelling undertaken and its content. It is at this high end of the participation spectrum that we locate 
mediated modelling, where the model is a by-product of team learning.88  
 There is another spectrum of participation in the modelling process, from involvement that is 
invited relatively late in the process, leaving little room for change by stakeholders, to a process in which 
participation shapes the modelling process from its inception. Mediated modelling then can range from 
relating and integrating existing information in the first instance, to providing support in exploring a 
range of innovative solutions while the group chooses the form and content of the model.  
This mediated modelling aims for collaborative team learning in the modelling process to 
improve the shared understanding of a community and to foster better consensus over planning goals and 
decisions. This is typically facilitated using computer software, such as STELLA® (used for the model 
developed in Part 2) to aid in the visualization of changes over time, aiding in participants’ understanding 
of the problem of goals being addressed, and the effects of suggested interventions and policies. 
Modelling software also enables a diverse range of stakeholders to better interactively and collaboratively 
design, construct and analyze a model of a complex system. The process of mediated modelling helps to 
structure a group’s thinking, discussions and stimulates joint learning in diverse groups. It is rooted in 
ecological economics, system dynamics thinking, organizational learning, social psychology, and other 
tools and concepts.89  
The process consists of preparation, workshops and follow-up coordinated by the modeller who 
acts as facilitator, mediator and modeller. The expected results include: team building and learning, 
(strong) consensus, a communication tool, decision support for policy and management, and adaptive 
management. While mediated modelling and other forms of high participation can make the modelling 
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process more time consuming and expensive, savings are made in the higher level of consensus, and thus 
better implementation of the policy decisions generated. 
Policies are thus treated as experiments that will require revisions and sometimes even 
retractions, but which allow for the flexibility required in responding to the dynamics of the complex 
systems in which we find ourselves.  
 
 
 
The benefits of systems-thinking and modelling in planning and development should now be 
clear, and the possibilities for application in the Caribbean context elucidated. Many of the challenges in 
the planning process, and in response to the vulnerability and instability generated by our ecological-
economic-social problems would be greatly aided by a fundamental shift to systems thinking, further 
facilitated by modelling tools and deep participation.  
While a mediated modelling process is out of the scope of this undertaking, the next major part of 
this paper will illustrate a systems dynamic model of land-use change on a Caribbean island state in order 
to demonstrate and evaluate modelling as a tool for policymaking. 
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Conclusion: A Normative Vision For Planning And Development In The 
Caribbean 
 
 The vision should be clear without being static. Our understanding of the challenges we face 
should be rooted in systems-thinking in order to address them successfully and sustainably in securing a 
future of prosperity for people and planet. In the Caribbean, this means throwing off the yoke of history 
and embracing our unique place in the world in order to develop innovative, contextual and adaptive 
strategies and solutions that generate resilience and set examples for the rest of the world as we face 
shared systemic issues.  
 Our inherent social plurality should be a point of inspiration for a plurality of ideas and design 
that reach across barriers to centre public participation and to treat policy as contextual, dynamic and 
ever-evolving. As much as we need broader ecological literacy, we also need to centre the people who 
bear witness to the effects of a changing climate and failing economic system in their everyday lives. 
Imparting rights to Nature and exploring application possibilities for strategies such as the blue-green and 
circular economies provide interesting points of departure for a new era in Caribbean planning and 
development. An expansion in the use of tools such a system dynamics modelling, geographic 
information systems, statistical models and role play games and exercise would greatly aid this effort. 
 We should focus less on a defined destination, and more on a process-journey that embodies the 
principles of justice, ecological sustainability and social inclusion to provide for prosperity in the broadest 
and deepest sense, for ourselves, and the living systems in which we are inextricably embedded.  
In the words of Fernando Coronil:  
“Although the future isn’t open, it offers openings. And although the final destination may not be 
clear, the sense of direction is: toward justice, equality, freedom, diversity, and social and 
ecological harmony. [We] have no map, but [we have] a compass.”90  
The future is uncertain, but with the right directional push, together we may arrive at the new world of our 
imaginings.  
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The Circular Economy 
 
To a large extent, the world in which we operate today follows a linear model: we extract raw 
materials, process them into final products, sell them, use them, and then throw them away when 
they either break, get old/worn out, or no longer serve our needs and wants.91 At the point of 
disposal, all of the energy and resources used in production are lost, not to mention the ever-
expanding stockpiles of waste in landfills and oceans today. 
 
In contrast, a circular economy is one where the resources coming into the economy are not 
allowed to become waste or lose their value—to the fullest extent feasible. Instead, this economy 
would recover those resources and keep them in productive use for as long as possible.92 
Understanding the economy (and the society and environment within which it is embedded) as a 
complex, dynamic, adaptive system, that is “much more a metabolism than a machine,”93 the 
circular economy has emerged, inspired by key texts such as Reinventing Fire (Amory Lovins), 
Natural Capitalism (Lovins, et. al), and Cradle to Cradle (McDonough and Braungart).94  
 
According to the Ellen MacArthur Foundation, the circular economy is based on three core 
principles: design out waste and pollution; keep products and materials in use; regenerate natural 
systems.95 With recent work on expanding this concept from the micro/business level to cities,96 
it is intended to expand into broad macro-level implementation to really have impact, with 
various countries and jurisdictions implementing circular economy-related laws and policies 
since the 1990s.97 The last decade has seen more circular economy research and policymaking 
than ever before, particularly in the European Union and global corporations, with consulting 
firm McKinsey estimating that the greater resource efficiency facilitated by the circular economy 
could save European manufacturers US$630 billion annually.98 
 
The Tearfund has presented case studies from the Global South of the benefits of supporting 
circular economy businesses,99 as there is increasing interest in its applications in the developing 
world. These benefits include: increasing productivity and economic growth; improving the 
quality and quantity of employment; and saving lives by reducing environmental impacts such as 
water and air pollution, and climate change.100 In the Caribbean, whose economies 
overwhelmingly rely on imports and the services sector, studies show that there is potential for 
the development of repair and remanufacturing services, as well as reverse logistics (i.e. the 
collection of products at end-of-use), thereby saving resources and generating employment.101 
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PART 2 
System Dynamics Model: Land Use Change on a Caribbean SIDS 
 
Introduction 
 
 The second central component of this major research exercise involves system dynamics 
modelling as a tool for development. The primary objective of this study is to simulate and forecast land-
use changes in the Caribbean to provide a tool for planners, policymakers, governments and institutions to 
think about future policies for the accommodation of economic growth, production efficiencies, and 
climate events. Tantamount to this objective is the goal to portray and evaluate the uses of system 
dynamics modelling as a tool for planning and development as a beginner modeller. It is my hope that 
other students, academics, researchers and practitioners will also see the merits of this methodology. 
The central question of this study is: What does sustainable land-use look like on a Caribbean 
small-island developing state? Germane to this inquiry are the implicit questions: What drives land-use 
change, and how can those drivers be manipulated to achieve patterns of land use that serve both human 
wellbeing and ecological sustainability? What are the socio-economic and environmental impacts of land-
use change? For a region deeply vulnerable and dependent upon the external global socio-economic and 
environmental landscape, land-use patterns impact self-sufficiency, from food security to access to 
essential goods, to local enterprise success, to import/export ratios, to employment and climate resilience. 
The external drivers of land-use change thus include: loan, aid and trade agreements, multinational 
corporation agreements, technological transfers. The more internal drivers include population change, 
property rights and other demographic, socio-economic, political and institutional factors and systems. 
For the purpose of this model, I focus on the factors of economic growth and industry production 
efficiencies, as well as environmental conservation, and climate change impacts.  
This analysis thus articulates the relationship between land uses (agricultural, forests, extractive, 
built), economic growth and climate change impacts. Using aggregate data for “Caribbean Small States” 
from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI) to represent a single small island state, the 
model’s results show a reasonable fit between the predicted and real data from the years 2000-2016, and 
taking a long-term view, projects the land use changes into the year 2100.  
This section proceeds as following: (1) an historical overview of land-use planning and change in 
the Caribbean and small-island states, including current trends and challenges; (2) an introduction to 
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system dynamics modelling as a method and tool, with specific explanation of the STELLA® software; 
(3) a conceptual look at the model: its logic, assumptions and limitations, and data sources; (4) a 
presentation and explanation of the model and its structure, along with scenarios, expected findings and 
results, and a discussion on feedback; (5) lessons learned from the exercise, evaluation of STELLA and 
system dynamics modelling in as a planning tool; and (6) next steps for further research and development 
of the model.  
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Land-Use Planning and Change in the Caribbean 
 
 As outlined earlier Planning in the Caribbean has a consistent history of foreign-imported policies 
and practices, from colonial transplantation under British rule, to externally determined policies post-
independence, finally to a newly emerging era of local designed frameworks based on the home context. 
The former Spanish colonies (Cuba, Dominican Republic, Puerto Rico) had different and earlier 
experiences of independence, allowing for a longer history of self-determined planning, while many of 
the French and Dutch still remain under “postcolonial” mandate today, with the exception of Suriname, 
whose trajectory more closely resembles that of the former British colonies, and Haiti with its own long, 
rich and well-known history.  
 The model focuses on the anglophone Caribbean, also known as the West Indies—the group of 
states most often assumed under the moniker “Caribbean.” This sub-region shares similar legacies of 
British colonization that has influenced national planning processes, frameworks and institutions into the 
present day. Now, Caribbean governments find themselves in need of new planning mechanisms, 
practices, policies and visions.  
 Current planning challenges in the region include: rapid urbanization, urban sprawl, urban 
informality, environmental degradation, inefficient infrastructure, and poor access to basic services.102 
Furthermore, less than ten percent of the urban landscape is in compliance with zoning regulations and 
building standards. Many of these regulations face strong public criticism for their rigidity and 
exorbitance, based on outmoded and irrelevant planning legislation and codes all too reminiscent of 
colonial times. Since those first planning acts were passed under British rule, local elites have continued 
to re-appropriate, adapt and mediate Western planning processes, in many cases to secure and expand 
their own power at the expense of local planning expertise, which has thus been marginalized.  
 Administrative deficiencies, changing economic trends and political expediency have undermined 
spatial planning.  There is a great need for  a systems approach that facilitates greater public buy-in and 
less static policy-making.  
 
                                                           
102 Mycoo, 2017 
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Understanding the Tool: System Dynamics Modelling and STELLA 
 
Models are by definition abstractions from reality; they are tools used to better understand the 
impact of alternate decisions on economic and other performance. They are indispensable to our 
understanding of the world because they enable us first to portray and manipulate real phenomena, and 
second, experiment and examine the results. We need models to generate new knowledge, as they help us 
to explain the world around us and potentially forecast the future.  With modelling, we can simplify 
complex, real-world phenomena that are otherwise difficult to comprehensively study, by eliminating 
everything that we believe to be irrelevant to the specific question at hand. Thus the process of model 
building itself involves some dynamism: build, run, compare, change—each cycle improving one’s 
understanding of reality. The goal in the end is a good model: one possessing elements that directly 
correspond to objects in reality, and that provides reliable answers to our questions.103 
Unlike static models (think standard/basic economic modelling) that represent and/or compare 
particular phenomena at specific point(s) in time, dynamic models try to reflect changes in real or 
simulated time, taking into account that the model components are constantly evolving as a result of 
previous actions. Centered around a focussed question, the boundaries of the system containing said 
question need to be established, along with the appropriate time interval and level of detail needed. A 
defining feature of dynamic models is feedback: one component of the model causes changes in other 
components, and those changes then lead to further change in the component that set the process in 
motion in the first place. 
 
                                                           
103 Ruth, M. and Hannon, B. (2012) Modeling Dynamic Economic Systems 2nd edition, Springer, Chapter 1. 
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STELLA 
The STELLA software used in this research provides an excellent example and resource for 
system dynamics modelling. It automatically generates the required differential equations based on a 
diagram of the system under investigation drawn by the modeller. Any user of the software can solve a 
complex system of equations without an extensive prerequisite knowledge of mathematics or statistics. 
 
 
 
In STELLA, the components of a model are represented by either a stock, a flow, a converter or 
a connector (figure above). These components can be arranged to model real-world behaviour: The stock 
of a certain variable starts off with a specific initial value, and can either increase or decrease, as a result 
of an inflow our outflow which are regulated by converters. Connectors are the information arrows that 
indicate a relationship between variables. For instance, in the diagram below, both flows are calculated 
using a converter and the stock, so the equation for the flows may look like:  
Inflow = Stock*Converter 1; Outflow = Stock*Converter 2.  
 
This can be further explained with the example of the population dynamic depicted below. The stock of 
population, which is assigned an initial value is increased by the inflow of births and decreased by the 
outflow of the deaths. The birth and death rates help to determine the volume of the flows in either 
direction respectively. Thus the equations would look like: 
Births = Population * birth rate; Deaths = Population * death rate 
STOCK FLOW CONVERTER CONNECTOR 
STELLA dynamic flow 
Figure 3 
Figure 4 
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The system can be expanded with more stocks, flows, converters and connectors to better represent a real 
dynamic system. Once the basic structure of the model is established, values and rates of various variables 
can be modified and manipulated to explore different policy options and the effects of forecasted events. 
Population dynamic 
Figure 5 
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The Model: from Concept to Exercise 
 
The logic of the model’s structure is centred on the starting assumption of a Caribbean island 
before development and intensive human land-use changes. The island is mostly covered by forest (this 
includes wetlands, savannahs and other ecosystems), which is developed into either agriculture, extractive 
industries, or built-up industries (this includes urban, residential, manufacturing, and other industrial 
activities). As shown in the figure below, the forest is thus the primary supplier of the land demanded by 
the agricultural, built and extractive uses, which are driven for the most part by economic growth.  
Figure 6  
Productive efficiencies temper this demand, as increased efficiency means less land area is required to 
produce the same level of output, as will be shown and explained from the model structure below. 
Using the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI), filtered for the aggregate 
Caribbean small states,104 the model starts in the year 2000, using the data for land area per land-use, 
average GDP growth, and average value added to GDP per land use.  This model was then 
operationalized with STELLA software developed by ISEE systems incorporated:105  
                                                           
104 WDI “Caribbean small states” includes: Antigua & Barbuda, the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, 
Guyana, Jamaica, St. Kitts & Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad & Tobago. 
105 Link to STELLA site: https://iseesystems.com/  
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The dynamics of the demand for land works structurally in the same way in all three of the 
demand land uses. Taking the extractive industry as an example, extractive expansion is determined by 
the "Extractive Area" required by the sector. This value depends on: (1) the amount of the state's GDP ($) 
garnered from the industry; and (2) the productivity of extractives, namely the amount of land (square 
Figure 7:Caribbean Land Use Model 
Structure 
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kilometers) required to generate $1 of GDP. The amount of the state’s GDP generated by the extractive 
industry is calculated using the total national GDP multiplied by the value added by Extractives to GDP 
(%), extrapolated from the historical data available. To determine the productivity level of extractives,  
the initial level of productivity is calculated using the value added to GDP(%), Initial GDP($) and Initial 
Extractive land (sq. km), then by factoring a rate of change of extractives productivity, we can generate 
current (and future) productivity. Thus, based on the amount of GDP generated by the extractive industry, 
and its productivity—i.e. the amount of land required to produce one dollar of GDP—to determine the 
land needed by the sector. The extractive expansion flow then is the difference between this required 
extractive area and the actual Extractives land stock at that point in time. 
The process runs quite the same in the Agricultural and Built-up land uses. To protect the Forest 
from complete depletion, we have a measure of Forest land protection through conservation efforts and 
policies. By determining what proportion of the forest we want to protect, we can calculate how much 
land is to be protected using the initial value for Forest Land. We also allow for the threat of land loss to 
sea level rise, which we account for in the same way as forest conservation. We determine the proportion 
of land loss to calculate the area of land loss, which can then be included in the equation for Forest.  For 
the other land uses only land lost to sea level rise is taken into account. (Refer to Appendix xx for the full 
list of model algorithms and equations).  
Having provided for some Forest conservation and overall land loss to sea level rise, we need to 
introduce a measure to ensure that the other land-uses can still expand as needed if the amount of Forest 
now available for development becomes depleted. Since Built-up Land has the highest value added to 
GDP, we assume that it is the one chosen by policymakers to continue to develop, taking from land 
previously designated for Agriculture. Thus if/when the land required for Built-up Area is no longer 
available from the available Forest, we have an additional flow to take from Agriculture. For a closer step 
by step look at the model (as well as the scenario experimentations in one of the upcoming sections), you 
can visit the site created with the interface where you can interactively learn about the model structure 
and manipulate the control variables yourself: 
https://exchange.iseesystems.com/public/aliciarichins/caribbeanlanduse. 
 
Assumptions and Limitations 
 
 The model assumes four major land uses: forest, agriculture, extractives and the built 
environment, where forest acts as a supply of land. “Forest” here ought not to be conflated with “forestry” 
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as a sector that contributes to GDP; it is simply a stock in this model. It is also assumed that the main 
driver of land-use change is economic growth, while the industries’ productive efficiencies also influence 
land demand in the opposite direction (higher productive efficiency, lower demand for land). Since 
fishery activity would have minimal impact on the on-land land-use pattern, it was left out of the model. 
Population has been left exogenous and is used to calculate GDP per capita.  
Given the relative simplicity of this model, and the novice level of its modeller, there are a 
number of clear limitations. The data source, while reliable includes non-island states in its considerations 
(Belize, Guyana, Suriname), which potentially has the effect of skewing the land use patterns. The use of 
aggregate instead of average or individual case study data may also significantly change land use patterns 
in addition to overestimating land mass, population, etc. There is also a lack of developed feedback loops, 
resulting in the model doing as designed and not portraying truly dynamic and potentially surprising 
results. For instance, GDP might be made more endogenous, to relay the feedback between changes in 
GDP and changes in land use. 
It is important to always keep in mind that a model is the product of the modeller’s own 
perception; as an abstraction it will always be by definition incomplete in some way or other. Therefore it 
is important to maintain an open and flexible modelling approach, just like the real systems that they are 
designed to emulate, and plurality and even competition amongst models should be encouraged in order 
to truly improve our collective understanding of real-world processes. Thus, my disclaimer: my model is 
imperfect and incomplete. I hope to continue developing it, and to encourage others to develop similar 
and competing models, so that we can generate ever-improving answers and solutions. 
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Scenarios and Expected Findings  
 
There are five (5) scenarios run in this exercise: Base Case, increased GDP growth, increased 
Productivity Growth, Forest Conservation and Sea Level Rise, followed by a composite scenario of all 
interventions and events. The details of each scenario are outlined in Table 1 below: (Each variable is 
expressed as a decimal). 
SCENARIOS 
GDP growth 
Agricultural 
Productivity 
Built Land 
Productivity 
Extractive 
Productivity 
Forest 
Conservation 
Land Loss 
to Sea Rise 
Base Case 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 
GDP Growth 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 
Productivity 
Growth 
0.02 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00 
Forest 
Conservation 
0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.12 0.00 
Sea Level 
Rise 
0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.08 
Composite 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.12 0.08 
The expected findings of the model are that a higher rate of GDP growth leads to faster forest depletion, 
while increased productivity efficiencies can counter-balance this effect. Forest conservation limits land 
available to other sectors, and in the case of high growth, induces other land-uses to become the supply 
for the highest value-generating use (here, built-up land). Sea level rise, while not necessarily affecting 
the pattern of land-use, decreases the size of the overall land mass, which, given the right conditions may 
also lead to more built-intensive land use  patterns.  
Scenario Results and Implications  
The initial values of the land stocks used in each scenario: 
STOCK Forest Agriculture Built-Up Extractives 
INITIAL VALUE 
(square kilometers) 
347 006 25 977 37 334 8 000 
Table 1 : Scenarios 
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1. Base Case 
Here, the annual GDP growth rate is roughly 2%, productivity growth rates for each sector are 1%, and 
there is no forest conservation or land loss to rising sea level. By the end of the century, about a third of 
the forest land is lost, while extractives, agriculture, and built uses grow at increasing rates respectively. 
Forest is the only stock measured on the right axis with its own scale since its initial value is so much 
greater than those for other land-uses. Assigning forest to its own axis and scale makes the graph easier to 
read, as it eliminates empty space and spreads the graph lines for the other land uses that would otherwise 
be much more concentrated at the bottom of the graph.  
Thus the Base Case allows for gradual land use expansion without complete forest depletion by the end of 
the century. Here also GDP per capita is maintained at $32,300.   
 
STOCK Forest Agriculture Built-Up Extractives 
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2. Higher GDP growth rate 
In Scenario 2 we have instituted a higher GDP growth rate of 4%, spurring land demand in all three of the 
demand sectors. The available forest is completely depleted by the end of the year 2061 in order to meet 
this demand; from the year 2062, no further land use expansion is possible. Meanwhile, as expected, we 
see considerable growth in GDP per capita, from $32,300 in the base case now to $225,000.  
 
1 Higher GDP Growth Rate 
STOCK Forest Agriculture Built-Up Extractives 
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3. Higher productivity growth rates 
In Scenario 3, the productivity growth rates increase for both Agricultural and Built-up land uses, to 3% 
and 2% annual growth respectively. With the increase in productivity growth rates in the demand sectors, 
we see more gradual growth in their land grabs, as they require fewer square kilometers to produce goods 
and generate GDP. The forest manages to survive until the year 2096. Note the different slopes in the land 
expansion graphs: Agriculture is declining in physical size as its productivity efficiency grows 
increasingly every year; Built-up is also declining, though much more slowly; and Extractive land grows 
as its productive efficiency grows the slowest. Without the increased GDP growth, GDP per capita is back 
to $32,300 for this scenario. 
  
STOCK Forest Agriculture Built-Up Extractives 
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4. Forest Conservation 
Scenario 4 now institutes a forest conservation measure, protecting 12% of the initial forest land from 
development (i.e. 41,640 square kilometers). Compared to the base case, the Forest land available for 
development is used up at a faster rate, given the lower initial available stock. All other behaviour is 
similar to Scenario 1 while the Forest is protected from complete depletion. Here too GDP per capita is 
maintained at $32,300. 
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5. Sea Level Rise 
In Scenario 5, the rising sea level takes 8% of the island’s total land mass, causing similar behaviour to 
the last scenario, as there is now just less land overall to be developed. Note that the separate right axis for 
the Forest stock makes it appear that Built-up land exceeds Forest, but this is not the case. The other land 
use patterns remain the same, with lower actual values across the board, and GDP per capita continues at 
$32,300. 
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6. Composite Scenario 
This Scenario serves to display the composite effects of the policy decisions to: increase the rate of 
growth of GDP, increase the productivity growth rates across sectors, conserve some forest land; in 
addition to facing the impending challenge of rising sea levels. While GDP per capita rises to $225,000, 
the Forest is completely depleted by the year 2087. Built-up land is able to expand despite this using the 
flow from Agricultural land, whose stock is left growing at a much slower overall rate than the other land 
uses.  
 
STOCK Forest Agriculture Built-Up Extractives 
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The table below presents a summary of the final results by the year 2100 for each scenario. As expected, 
GDP per capita was only affected by the increased growth rate in the second scenario.  
SCENARIOS FOREST  
(sq km) 
AGRICULTURE BUILT-UP EXTRACTIVES GDP per 
capita ($) 
Base Case 231,000 68,200 98,000 21,000 $32,300 
GDP Growth 0 153,000 219,000 46,700 $225,000 
Productivity 
Growth 
352,000 9,050 35,900 21,000 $32,300 
Forest 
Conservation 
189,000 
(41,640) 
68,200 98,000 21,000 $32,300 
Sea Level Rise 165,000 79,900 115,000 24,600 $32,300 
Composite 0 (41,640) 53,300 193,000 97,400 $225,000 
 
 
 
 
 
Discussion: Policy Responses as Feedback  
 
 
While the model structure lacks feedback loops built into its design, it is worthwhile to consider 
the feedback that is likely to occur between the system outcomes of the model scenarios and 
policymaking/policy responses. In this way we may contemplate not only the way that the policy 
decisions implied by the scenarios affect model output, but then also how the model output may affect 
future policy responses and decisions. Thus we can make educated guesses about the institutional learning 
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and evolution of planning frameworks that would occur in tandem with the changes in land use projected 
by the model. 
 
Base Case:  The most likely response in this case would follow along with the business-as-usual 
policymaking already at work in the Caribbean. While certain environmental concerns may be 
addressed—in the case of this model, conservation policies to protect the forest—for the most part, 
policymakers would concern themselves with the pursuit of increased economic growth. This would 
mean, in addition to monetary and fiscal policies, the pursuit of foreign direct investment and financing. 
The implications for land use would be an expansion in the built environment and extractive industries in 
particular, to the detriment of green spaces (forests) and agriculture, as seen in Scenario 2 (increased 
economic growth rate). 
 
Higher GDP growth: While economic development most narrowly defined is served in this scenario,  the 
complete decimation of forested lands would spur policy responses for ecosystem and natural 
environment protection. It is hoped that action would be taken before the complete depletion of the forest, 
however, responding to the model output as at the year 2100, we would expect extensive “greening the 
city” policies to regrow the natural landscape to the extent possible, and more critically, policies and 
technological transfer investments into increasing productive efficiencies in order to allow a contraction 
of land uses, particularly in agriculture and the built environment.  
 
Productivity Growth: With productive efficiencies secured, policymakers would presumably seek out 
ways to increase GDP, through monetary and fiscal policy, and foreign investment and financing. While 
increasing GDP would also increase land use expansion, the high levels of productive efficiency attained 
should significantly protect the forest and natural environment from extensive devastation.  
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Forest Conservation:  Having natural environment safeguards in place, the most likely response here 
would also be to seek increased economic growth.  It can also be argued that policymakers so concerned 
with forest conservation in the first place would also seek increases in productive efficiencies in order to 
continue to conserve forested lands.  Higher GDP growth would induce more land use expansion, which 
would be constrained if efficiency gains are secured, otherwise we may have to rely on the original (or 
expanded) forest conservation measure to protect the natural environment from depletion.  
 
Sea Level Rise: In the case of rising sea levels and a base case policy scenario (in addition to taking into 
account the fact that most urban centres in the Caribbean are located on coastlines), we would expect 
major relocation and resettlement policies to emerge, expanding the built environment to the further 
detriment of the natural.  In conjunction with these efforts would be technological transfer policies to 
improve productive efficiencies in order to contend with decreasing land mass.  
 
Composite Case: In response to the composite scenario where high productive efficiencies and economic 
growth are secured, along with forest conservation policy, we would expect the pursuit of even more 
increases in productivity rates to allow for the regeneration of forest land available for development. This 
may unfortunately occur in tandem with the retraction of some conservation areas to provide more 
immediate access to land development, especially considering the effect of land loss to rising sea levels 
on the built environment in particular.  
 
On this account we find that an extrapolation of the feedback between system outcomes and 
policy responses is a possible and valuable exercise, as it enhances not just the model, but the 
understanding of system under simulation.
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Model Output: Lessons Learned 
  
As is often quoted by Professor Peter Victor, the real output of any model is the improved 
understanding of the real-world phenomena under examination that the modeller (and if communicated 
well, its users/readers) gains from the exercise. While this project was an exercise in patience and deep 
thought, and many rounds of trial and error, I believe I’ve developed some confidence in my modelling 
skillset, while there is still ever more to learn.  
 From this project I’ve gained a better understanding of the dynamics of land use change both in 
general, and in the Caribbean context. While there are many model limitations, this exercise has 
challenged me to think about the systems and factors involved in land use change, and the policies 
implicated in the scenarios created. For instance, attaining the goal of increasing productive efficiency 
would rely upon expanded education, research and innovation, as well as technological transfers and 
technical assistance from external parties, whether they be other states or multilateral organizations. As 
shown from the model in Scenario 3, the most sustainable way to simultaneously protect ecosystems, 
industries and human wellbeing is to improve productivity—industries become less land-intensive, goods 
and services are provided for, and with a more modest growth rate, the forest would not be depleted. 
 I believe that the discussion on feedback between the model output and corresponding policy 
responses also greatly enhanced my consideration and understanding of the dynamics of land use change 
in this Caribbean context, allowing for a longer-term frame of reference for both the implied policies of 
the scenarios, and the subsequent policy responses to the output generated by each scenario.  
 While in reality forest conservation measures are very much in place across the Caribbean, 
increasing urbanization along with population growth and the desire to attract foreign investment and 
tourism income sees many conservation or land protection boundaries receding to make way for 
residential developments and private international hotel chains. It is my hope that the model was able to 
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provide a clear if simplistic justification for the maintenance—and perhaps even expansion in some 
cases—of land conservation and protection policies founded on the notion of nature as value, having 
intrinsic worth above and apart from human use. 
 
Blaming the Tool: “only a poor tradesperson blames their tools” 
 
 STELLA is a fantastic tool. It allows for clear visualization of intangible processes over time; 
in the model-building process, one is able to give figures and direction to concepts beyond mere graphs 
and tables. This is possible through the visualization of as wide a span of variables as the modeller can 
imagine, and learning how exactly the dots may connect to create change. It is user-friendly software, but 
not particularly easy to use due to the critical and strategic thought required to produce a model that 
simulates reality and is able to forecast the future based on current reality. Being able to communicate 
model results in the interface is particularly helpful as the audience does not require any knowledge of the 
software, just of the problem and the variables at hand. 
 The only real limit that was felt particularly given the land-use focus of this model was the 
inability to incorporate geographical, physical visualizations of the land-use changes and patterns 
generated by the model. Incorporating GIS analysis to add this layer would be imperative for future 
development. 
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Next Steps 
  
Given the limitations of this beta model, it is important to identify next steps to further develop and 
improve the model: 
• Taking the model from the aggregate to the state level, and running for each individual 
country I believe would prove useful in identifying similarities and differences in patterns 
across the region, and seeing more clearly the impact of the scenario modifications. 
• As mentioned earlier, this model lacks true feedback loops, due mostly to my lack of 
modelling prowess, and asking questions with closed instead of open answers when building 
the model itself (i.e. flaws in my model-building process). Finding ways to incorporate 
feedback into the model dynamics would be at the very top of my list for further development. 
This would necessarily include feedback loops between changes in GDP, land use expansion, 
and GDP again. 
• This model is also limited to internal dynamics—further development ought to include the 
ways in which external dynamics and events bear on local land use changes for a more 
comprehensive and thorough picture of what’s happening. 
• I would also venture to expand upon the sectors themselves: the Forest would include a 
forestry sector that contributes to GDP; fisheries would be included; “Built-up” would be 
broken down into smaller subcategories. Finally, the model logic of forest as the main source 
of land supply would be amended to incorporate the ways in which all land-use types can be 
both supply and demand.  
While limited by experience and time, I believe this exercise produced a useful tool and even more useful 
skills and insights that will spur more questions and answers for myself and others. 
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APPENDIX  
STELLA® Algorithm 
 
"%_protected_forest" = 0 
Agri_Area = Agri_Area_per_unit_Agri_GDP*GDP_from_Agri 
Agri_Area_per_unit_Agri_GDP = Intial_Ag_Productivity*(1-
Agricultural_productivity_rate_of_change)^(TIME-2000) 
Agricultural_productivity_rate_of_change = 0.01 
"Agriculture_(sq_km)"(t) = "Agriculture_(sq_km)"(t - dt) + (Agricultural_Expansion - "into_Built-
Up_Land") * dt 
    INIT "Agriculture_(sq_km)" = Initial_Agriculture*(1-"Land_Loss_to_Rising_Sea_Level_(%)") 
    INFLOWS: 
        Agricultural_Expansion = Agri_Area-"Agriculture_(sq_km)" 
    OUTFLOWS: 
        "into_Built-Up_Land" = IF("Forest_(sq_km)"-"Protected_Forest_(sq_km)")>=0 THEN 0 ELSE 
Built_Expansion 
Built_Area = Built_Area_per_unit_Built_GDP*GDP_from_Built 
Built_Area_per_unit_Built_GDP = Initial_built_productivity*(1-
Built_productivity_rate_of_change)^(TIME-2000) 
Built_productivity_rate_of_change = 0.01 
"Built-up_Land_(sq_km)"(t) = "Built-up_Land_(sq_km)"(t - dt) + (Built_Expansion + 
from_Agricultural_Land) * dt 
    INIT "Built-up_Land_(sq_km)" = Initial_Built*(1-"Land_Loss_to_Rising_Sea_Level_(%)") 
    INFLOWS: 
        Built_Expansion = Built_Area-"Built-up_Land_(sq_km)" 
        from_Agricultural_Land = "into_Built-Up_Land" 
Extractive_Area = Extractive_Area_per_unit_Extrative_GDP*GDP_from_Extr 
Extractive_Area_per_unit_Extrative_GDP = Initial_extractives_productivity*(1-
Extractive_prooductivity_rate_of_change)^(TIME-2000) 
Extractive_prooductivity_rate_of_change = 0.01 
"Extractives_(sq_km)"(t) = "Extractives_(sq_km)"(t - dt) + (Extractive_Expansion) * dt 
    INIT "Extractives_(sq_km)" = Initial_Extractives*(1-"Land_Loss_to_Rising_Sea_Level_(%)") 
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    INFLOWS: 
        Extractive_Expansion = Extractive_Area-"Extractives_(sq_km)" 
"Forest_(sq_km)"(t) = "Forest_(sq_km)"(t - dt) + ( - Agricultural_Expansion - Built_Expansion - 
Extractive_Expansion) * dt 
    INIT "Forest_(sq_km)" = Initial_Forest-"Protected_Forest_(sq_km)"-
"Forest_Lost_to_Sea_Rise_(sq_km)" 
    OUTFLOWS: 
        Agricultural_Expansion = Agri_Area-"Agriculture_(sq_km)" 
        Built_Expansion = Built_Area-"Built-up_Land_(sq_km)" 
        Extractive_Expansion = Extractive_Area-"Extractives_(sq_km)" 
"Forest_Lost_to_Sea_Rise_(sq_km)" = Initial_Forest*"Land_Loss_to_Rising_Sea_Level_(%)" 
GDP = Initial_GDP*(1+i)^(TIME-2000) 
GDP_from_Agri = GDP*"Value_added_by_Agri_to_GDP_(%)" 
GDP_from_Built = "Value_added_by_Built_to_GDP_(%)"*GDP 
GDP_from_Extr = "Value_added_by_Extractives_to_GDP_(%)"*GDP 
GDP_per_capita = GDP/Population 
i = 0.021632954 
Initial_built_productivity = INIT(Initial_Built/Initial_GDP_from_Built) 
Initial_extractives_productivity = INIT(Initial_Extractives/Initial_GDP_from_Extractives) 
Initial_GDP_from_Agri = Initial_GDP*"Value_added_by_Agri_to_GDP_(%)" 
Initial_GDP_from_Built = Initial_GDP*"Value_added_by_Built_to_GDP_(%)" 
Initial_GDP_from_Extractives = Initial_GDP*"Value_added_by_Extractives_to_GDP_(%)" 
Intial_Ag_Productivity = INIT(Initial_Agriculture/Initial_GDP_from_Agri) 
Land = "Extractives_(sq_km)"+"Forest_(sq_km)"+"Agriculture_(sq_km)"+"Built-up_Land_(sq_km)" 
"Land_Loss_to_Rising_Sea_Level_(%)" = 0 
Population = GRAPH(TIME) 
(2000.00, 6530691), (2001.00, 6577216), (2002.00, 6623792), (2003.00, 6670276), (2004.00, 6716373), 
(2005.00, 6761932), (2006.00, 6806838), (2007.00, 6851221), (2008.00, 6895315), (2009.00, 6939534), 
(2010.00, 6984096), (2011.00, 7029022), (2012.00, 7074129), (2013.00, 7118888), (2014.00, 7162679), 
(2015.00, 7204948), (2016.00, 7245472) 
"Protected_Forest_(sq_km)" = Initial_Forest*"%_protected_forest" 
"Value_added_by_Agri_to_GDP_(%)" = 0.046551579 
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"Value_added_by_Built_to_GDP_(%)" = 0.242606443 
"Value_added_by_Extractives_to_GDP_(%)" = 0.066027873 
 
********** 
INITIAL_VALUES: 
********** 
historical_GDP = GRAPH(TIME) 
(2000.00, 32257000000), (2001.00, 33177000000), (2002.00, 34949000000), (2003.00, 37501000000), 
(2004.00, 41179000000), (2005.00, 46656000000), (2006.00, 52416000000), (2007.00, 58371000000), 
(2008.00, 66597000000), (2009.00, 55887000000), (2010.00, 60945000000), (2011.00, 66198000000), 
(2012.00, 70648000000), (2013.00, 71285000000), (2014.00, 71393000000), (2015.00, 69516000000), 
(2016.00, 66707000000) 
Initial_Agriculture = 25977 
Initial_Built = 37334 
Initial_Extractives = 8000 
Initial_Forest = 347006 
Initial_GDP = 32257000000 
Initial_Population = 2200000 
 
********** 
 
 
